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CONTRIBUTED ARTICLE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF SANCTIONS AS A TOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STATECRAFT: SOCIAL POWER THEORY AS A PREDICTOR OF THREAT THEORY UTILITY

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BIO:

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SUMMARY:

... Unlike the generic term "sanction" applied to international trade, UNSC imposed sanctions are forceful actions that are internationally legitimized. ... Yet, rather than relying on a one-dimensional understanding of state power as derived from general or transitory economic imbalance, which in turn drives the power and effectiveness of a sanctions threat through the use of an economic sanctions tool, the sanctioning state must embrace the broader concept of social psychological persuasive power in order to cause the target state to accept the sanction program's underlying policy mandate at the threat communication stage. ... The following section represents a concise analysis of social power theory and the five bases of social power-coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power-in the context of a successful threat by the League of Nations (LON) against Greece following a border skirmish between Bulgaria and Greece in 1925. ...

HIGHLIGHT: *Sanctions . . . stand entre le rapport et les soldats.* ⁿ¹

TEXT:

[*105] I. INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is charged with maintaining international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). ⁿ² The UNSC is comprised of fifteen members, five of which are permanent members with a veto power (namely, the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom), and ten of which are rotating members that serve under two-year terms. ⁿ³ The decisions of the UNSC are binding upon all member states [*106] according to Article 25 of the UN Charter; accordingly, these decisions carry the full weight and authority of international law. ⁿ⁴ More importantly, the power of the UNSC to impose sanctions to

maintain international peace is rooted in Articles 39 through 42 of the UN Charter. The UNSC, by virtue of Article 39, "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" ⁿ⁵ and may take provisional measures under Article 40 while analyzing a situation to determine if more severe actions are necessitated. ⁿ⁶ Should further measures be required, Article 41 allows the UNSC to enact sanctions that include the "interruption of economic relations" and other similar measures "not involving the use of armed force . . ." ⁿ⁷ If steps taken by the UNSC under Article 41 are ineffective, Article 42 allows the UNSC to instruct member forces to "take such action by air, sea, or land . . . necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." ⁿ⁸

[*107] The UNSC has resorted to sanctions as an enforcement mechanism when international peace has been threatened and diplomacy has failed. ⁿ⁹ As is evident, UNSC enacted sanctions are neither trade policies nor transnational business practices, but are instead instruments of international politics. ⁿ¹⁰ Unlike the generic term "sanction" applied to international trade, UNSC imposed sanctions are forceful actions that are internationally legitimized. ⁿ¹¹ What is more, a UNSC declaration of a sanctions decision legally obligates all member states of the United Nations (UN) "to impose and enforce the stipulated restrictive measures against a targeted state." ⁿ¹² Sanctions are instituted as a result of a targeted state's failure to observe international norms or legal obligations, and the goal of sanctions is to force the deviant state to return to acceptable behavior and meet UNSC mandated objectives without the use of force. ⁿ¹³ The types of sanctions that are imposed can include comprehensive economic and trade sanctions, or more specific and targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial restrictions, and diplomatic limitations. ⁿ¹⁴ To date, sanctions have been employed for a diverse range of purposes, including: reversing territorial aggression; restoring democratically elected leaders; promoting human rights; deterring and punishing terrorism; promoting disarmament; and bringing belligerents to peace negotiations. ⁿ¹⁵ Ideally, when the UNSC institutes a sanctions decision, it should endow the sanctions regime with a credible monitoring arm. Furthermore, the Sanctions Secretariat should be equipped with the requisite resources and specialized expertise to effectively administer the sanctions, and the Secretariat should also be prepared to analyze and assess the effectiveness of the sanctions measures, their possible humanitarian impacts, and any externalities imposed upon third parties. ⁿ¹⁶

The resort to sanctions as a political enforcement tool is a rather common, albeit a recent, phenomenon for the UNSC. ⁿ¹⁷ During the first **[*108]** forty-five years of its existence, the UN only imposed sanctions on two occasions: the economic blockade of Southern Rhodesia (1966-1979) ⁿ¹⁸ and the arms embargo on South Africa (1977-1994). ⁿ¹⁹ However, the end of the Cold War facilitated accord among the UNSC's five permanent members (5Ps), at which point sanctions started to be implemented against a number of target states. ⁿ²⁰ In fact, from 1990 onward--a period David Cartwright and George A. Lopez call the "Sanctions Decade" ⁿ²¹--mandatory sanctions were instituted against: Afghanistan (1999-); ⁿ²² Angola (1993-); ⁿ²³ Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-2001); ⁿ²⁴ Haiti (1993-1994); ⁿ²⁵ Iraq (1990-2003); ⁿ²⁶ Liberia (1992-); ⁿ²⁷ Libya (1992-2003); ⁿ²⁸ Rwanda (1993-); ⁿ²⁹ Sierra Leone (1997-); ⁿ³⁰ Somalia (1992-); ⁿ³¹ Sudan (1996-2001); ⁿ³² and the former Yugoslavia (1992-2002). ⁿ³³ Additionally, during this same period UN member states imposed unilateral, bilateral, or regional economic sanctions more than three dozen times. ⁿ³⁴ Unsurprisingly, the increased frequency with which sanctions were imposed vexed international policy analysts, as they pondered whether a new trend was emerging. ⁿ³⁵ Contemporaneously, sanctioning measures generated a substantial amount of discussion in the academic and policy spheres. ⁿ³⁶ For instance, scholars and policymakers were concerned that sanctions regimes engendered **[*109]** excessive humanitarian impacts, as well as created other negative externalities, such as discommoding neighboring states. ⁿ³⁷

Arguably, one of the most hotly debated aspects of recent UNSC sanctions policy concerns whether or not instituted sanctions effectively achieve their stated mandate. ⁿ³⁸ Even though this subject is patently worthy of rigorous exploration, the purpose of this analysis is not to explore the extant cases of imposed sanctions, which have to date been thoroughly scrutinized by numerous scholars, such as Cortright and Lopez. ⁿ³⁹ Instead, this Article endeavors to analyze a vital component of sanctions that must be considered in assessing the effectiveness of any sanctions regime, but has nonetheless been largely neglected in the academic and policymaking literature: the "threat" of sanctions as a powerful international policy enforcement tool. In order to provide an appropriate framework for this exercise, the Article methodically progresses through nine sections.

First, the Article explores the definition and purposes of sanctions in order to provide the reader with a basic overview of sanctions utility, as well as an understanding of the sanctions term as employed in this analysis. Second, the Article discusses the proposed mechanics of the sanctions tool, specifically noting the avowed flaws in the instrument's functioning. Third, the Article covers the extant literature on sanctions' effectiveness and addresses the paradoxical research findings and their proposed explanations. Fourth, the Article discusses the importance of threat theory as an integral factor in the success of sanctions, and explains that game theorists assert that the research literature has missed sanctions threat cases, thereby resulting in selection bias. And fifth, the Article investigates the academic literature's discussion of power and its role in explicating the effectiveness of a sanctions threat; this investigation concludes that scholars commit a persistent error in assuming that power is derived unitarily from an economic base.

Upon completing the first five sections, the Article moves into the sixth section, which introduces a social influence concept known as social power theory. This section provides an overview of social power theory, including the theory's account of psychological change, social influence, social power, and independent versus dependent change in an influence target. The section then explicates the bases of social power: coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power.ⁿ⁴⁰ Finally, the section concludes with the application of social power theory in a historical case of a sanctions threat: The League of [*110] Nations versus Greece (1925). This discussion describes the border skirmish between Greece and Bulgaria, employs social power theory to explain the sanctions threat's success, and concludes with a brief summary of the case analysis and its results.

Seventh, the Article identifies social power theory's policy implications for the UN whenever the UNSC decides to institute a sanctions threat. Eighth, the Article then addresses the limitations of social power theory as promulgated in this analysis and also cites additional sanctions-related areas for social power theory application. And lastly, the Article concludes by concisely summarizing its arguments and findings.

II. SANCTIONS DEFINITION AND PURPOSES

In 1945, Albert Hirschman authored a seminal work, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, in which he asserted that great state powers could use economic coercion to extract concessions from weaker states.ⁿ⁴¹ Although this claim was not altogether novel, as economic statecraft had long been an important feature of international relations,ⁿ⁴² Hirschman's treatise was noteworthy because it illustrated the relationship between foreign trade and economic power.ⁿ⁴³ For example, Nazi Germany's policy toward the Balkans followed this model: the Nazis utilized trade policy to gain broad political leverage.ⁿ⁴⁴ Nevertheless, despite the contribution made by Hirschman, the statecraft tool of economic coercion rapidly fell into disfavor. Beginning with the Cold War, and carrying forward to the present day, sanctions have been heavily criticized as a policy tool in international relations.ⁿ⁴⁵ In fact, policy analysts have not only criticized multilateral sanctions imposed by the UN, but also such criticisms have been levied at unilaterally and bilaterally imposed sanctions, as well as sanctions instituted through regional arrangements.ⁿ⁴⁶

For the purposes of this analysis, a basic definition of sanctions is as follows: sanctions are a tool for coercing a target to change a course of action or forgo some future course of action by altering the cost-benefit calculus of a decision-maker to favor the preferred policy of the sender.ⁿ⁴⁷ [*111] This definition follows the traditional understanding of sanctions, which is premised upon what is known as "instrumental theory."ⁿ⁴⁸ Other commentators proffer differing theoretical rationales for sanction regimes, such as the coterie behind public choice theory, which asserts that sanctions serve the interests of pressure groups in the sanctioning countries.ⁿ⁴⁹ Despite these heterogeneous theoretical views on sanction rationales, the stated definition that supports instrumental theory shall be adopted for purposes of this study, but this acceptance in no way implies that sanctions only serve instrumental ends. Instead, a definition anchored within instrumental theory is favored because it is valuable for exploring the power of social influence in the context of the sanctions threat. That said, the more important lesson for the student of sanctions is to thoroughly comprehend the difference between the "means" chosen to coerce the target state, which are the sanctions, and the "ends," which are the policy changes desired in the target state.ⁿ⁵⁰ For instance, the UNSC could decide to impose an economic sanction--such as a severe trade embargo--against a target state that is enslaving and torturing its own citizenry. The trade embargo is a tool (the "means") for causing economic pain in the target state, in hopes of

generating a policy change (the "ends"). In this hypothetical, the target state is violating a *jus cogens* obligation, and the international community desires that the target state cease its human rights abuses. ⁿ⁵¹ The economic sanction (trade embargo) is just one of several tools that might be used to effect a policy change in the target state. For example, the UNSC might impose travel and diplomatic restrictions on key target state officials responsible for the human rights abuses. Here, the policy goal remains the same, while the means for engendering the policy change has been altered (i.e., a trade embargo versus travel and diplomatic restrictions).

The sanctions tool is instituted against a target state for a variety of reasons; no policy discussion shortage exists in the academic literature. ⁿ⁵² Sanctions may be imposed upon a target state to cause external change, such as the withdrawal of a target state from a territory that it has seized illegally or inappropriately occupied (e.g., South Africa's extended occupation [*112] of Namibia), or sanctions may be directed at fostering internal change, such as ending patterns of egregious human rights violations in the target state (e.g., consider the example of present-day China). ⁿ⁵³ Sanctions might even seek to encourage the replacement of the elite governmental members of a target country (e.g., consider the recent case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq). ⁿ⁵⁴ Despite the array of *sui generis* cases that could trigger the imposition of a sanctions regime, Chesterman and Pouligny embrace parsimony and provide academics and policymakers with a tripartite categorization scheme that sufficiently characterizes the policy explanations for sanctions institutions. ⁿ⁵⁵ First, sanctions may be imposed to entail a target state to comply with international law. This goal may be based upon a desire to change political behavior in the target state, such as ceasing hostile activities, or to encourage a compromise settlement between parties having a conflict. Note, it can be useful to distinguish between a sanctions demand made upon a functioning state's political entity, as opposed to an incoherent political entity, such as a belligerent group or failed state. ⁿ⁵⁶ Second, sanctions may be instituted to contain a conflict within or between states. The most frequent tool in this regard is the arms embargo, though of late the UNSC has attempted to address the economic factors that can exacerbate or extend the conflict. ⁿ⁵⁷ Third, sanctions may [*113] be enacted to express outrage with the behavior of a target state, while the sanctions regime may not have an express mandate. ⁿ⁵⁸ One example of this category may be the first round of sanctions imposed on Afghanistan in 1999. ⁿ⁵⁹

Despite the utility of this tripartite sanctions categorization scheme, it would behoove the student of sanctions to remember a vital point when classifying sanctions based upon a stated sanctions regime mandate: despite the ostensible agreement in UNSC for implementing sanctions against a target state, the reasons that the individual members have for supporting the scheme may be plagued by substantial heterogeneity. ⁿ⁶⁰ In fact, Lisa Martin argued in her 1992 study that the cooperation that sustains sanctions tends to change among states as the sanction episode progresses. ⁿ⁶¹ Moreover, the larger and more powerful states, like the 5Ps, have tended to capture and steer the sanctions enterprise to meet their foreign policy objectives, which may or may not match those of the UN community. ⁿ⁶² This argument will be explored more fully in discussing the effectiveness of sanctions regimes.

III. THE PROPOSED MECHANICS OF SANCTIONS

The core enterprise of comprehensive multilateral economic sanctions can be understood in the familiar terms of an agency relationship because collectively imposed sanctions delegate the task of deterring wrongdoing to groups. ⁿ⁶³ The principal, who is the sanctioner, seeks to motivate a group, as the agent, to implement a regulatory regime that generates deterrence of wrongdoing by individual group members. ⁿ⁶⁴ The economic deprivation that is threatened or caused by the principal's sanctions efforts is expected to cause the agent to stop the undesirable behavior. ⁿ⁶⁵ Ideally, the sanctioner can realize efficiency gains where the costs of maintaining or executing the sanctions against the group, plus the costs of group-level control are less than the costs of maintaining or executing sanctions directly towards the individual wrongdoer. ⁿ⁶⁶ Of course, whether or not comprehensive sanctions actually deter wrongdoing depends to some extent [*114] on the solidarity of the group. ⁿ⁶⁷ For instance, consider the case where the UNSC imposes sanctions against a target state that is accused of violating a *jus cogens* norm. According to the "principal-agent sanctions model," by inflicting a significant amount of economic pain on the target state's citizenry through comprehensive economic sanctions, citizens in the target state will push for political change by redirecting the target state's national policy or removing the governmental parties from office who are responsible for the sanctioned activities. ⁿ⁶⁸ Johan Galtung termed this proposed sequence of events the "naive theory" of sanctions because it

assumes that a social mechanism exists in the target state that can transform economic damage into political change.ⁿ⁶⁹ In order for the naive theory of sanctions to hold, there must be sufficient group solidarity within the target country to allow the citizenry to control the wrongdoers--the governmental leadership or elites that establish national policy.ⁿ⁷⁰ There is no assurance that sufficient group solidarity will exist to accomplish this goal, especially when the target state operates under a dictatorial or authoritative regime.ⁿ⁷¹ Additionally, even in a case where group solidarity does exist in the target state, comprehensive sanctions that impose broad economic costs on the target state's population can produce a nationalist backlash, creating what is known as the "rally around the flag" effect.ⁿ⁷² Here, the leadership of the targeted state redirects the discontent and frustration created by sanctions hardships away from the regime that maintains the sanctioned policies toward the external actors that have instituted the sanctions.ⁿ⁷³ Instead of engendering the desired change, the sanctions may fuel nationalist sentiment and generate increased autarky in the target state,ⁿ⁷⁴ thus becoming "actually counterproductive as a tool of foreign policy."ⁿ⁷⁵ An autocratic regime may also reap further benefits from comprehensive sanctions because it is in the best position to control economic activity and the allocation of scarce resources.ⁿ⁷⁶ As a result, the elites that should suffer [*115] from the imposed sanctions may instead enrich themselves by profiting from black market smuggling and illicit trade activities.ⁿ⁷⁷

When the numerous pitfalls associated with comprehensive sanctions programs are considered in conjunction with the dire humanitarian consequences that these regimes oft produce,ⁿ⁷⁸ such as the situation that existed in Iraq,ⁿ⁷⁹ it becomes increasingly evident why the UN has started to explore other policy options. To date, one of the most popular alternatives has been known as the "smart sanction," which is a phrase indicating the use of targeted or selective sanctions as opposed to comprehensive sanctions.ⁿ⁸⁰ From a mechanical standpoint, smart sanctions are designed to minimize the humanitarian impact that can occur in a comprehensive sanctions regime by applying measures designed to impact the governmental officials, elites, or other parties specifically responsible for creating and maintaining the deviant policies. Examples of smart sanctions include financial sanctions (e.g., asset freezes and financial restrictions), travel sanctions (e.g., visa bans and airline restrictions), commodity boycotts (e.g., commodities such as oil, diamonds, and lumber products), and arms embargoes.ⁿ⁸¹ Even though there is little doubt that smart sanctions mitigate the humanitarian impact of a sanctions regime, whether these sanctions are indeed "smarter" from a political effectiveness standpoint when compared to comprehensive sanctions is a question that is yet unsettled.ⁿ⁸² Nevertheless, scholars in the academic and policymaking communities have produced substantial work regarding how to improve the effectiveness of smart sanctions.ⁿ⁸³ For the purposes of this analysis, the distinction [*116] between comprehensive and smart sanctions will not be discussed further; the matter is beyond the scope of the study.

IV. RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS

The progressively frequent employment of sanctions by the UNSC might bespeak to the casual scholar that sanctions are a settled tool of international enforcement. Paradoxically, there is a long and distinguished line of scholarly works that attempts to evaluate whether sanctions work--in the sense of bringing about a policy change in the target state--and these studies generally conclude that sanctions are ineffective in this regard.ⁿ⁸⁴ Margaret Doxey, who is labeled "the dean of sanctions scholars" by Cortright and Lopez,ⁿ⁸⁵ has asserted that at best sanctions achieve only modest gains that are obtainable from a "slap on the wrist."ⁿ⁸⁶ Sanctions critics assert that sanctions regimes are plagued with numerous troubles, including strengthening the target governments or elites that they seek to coerce; being assigned blame for sanctions-induced humanitarian suffering; failing to appropriately recognize and compensate third party costs, which encourages cheating; and encountering persistent implementation, monitoring, and enforcement problems.ⁿ⁸⁷ The puzzle is, however, if sanctions do not work, then why are sanctions used more often, and for a wider range of issues, in recent years?ⁿ⁸⁸

[*117] As might be expected, the consensus on the ineffectiveness of sanctions is not complete.ⁿ⁸⁹ In what is perhaps the most discussed study to date conducted by the International Institute of Economics (IIE Study), Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott compiled a database of 116 sanctions cases spanning the years 1914 to 1990.ⁿ⁹⁰ The researchers crafted a sanctions rating system that strove to determine whether the target complied with the sanctioner's goals, and whether the sanctions were the primary cause of the target state's policy change.ⁿ⁹¹ The coding system created four categories, ranging from complete success to total failure. If the most stringent definition of

success was used, 34% of the cases qualified as a success.ⁿ⁹² In contrast, less than 30% of the cases fell into the category of complete failure. Although a 34% success rate is modest at best, it fails to show that sanctions are totally ineffective as a tool of international policy enforcement.ⁿ⁹³ Nevertheless, the IIE Study was attacked by scholars such as Robert Pape, who argued that many of the sanctions cases in the study's database were miscoded.ⁿ⁹⁴ After recoding the allegedly [*118] miscoded cases, Pape performed statistical analysis that determined sanctions succeeded in only 5% of the cases.ⁿ⁹⁵ Even though Pape's study produced a contradictory result indicating sanctions' ineffectiveness, reviewers attacked his results on methodological grounds.ⁿ⁹⁶

Taking a broader perspective on research methodology, Cortright and Lopez argue that in general the empirical research--such as the IIE Study--suffers from two key weaknesses.ⁿ⁹⁷ The first stated weakness is that there is no systematic study of UN imposed sanctions cases. Statistical generalizations are reached by combining unilateral, bilateral, and regional sanctions cases along with multilateral sanctions regimes.ⁿ⁹⁸ This critique is plainly correct, but its utility is questionable for three reasons. First, because the UN has only imposed sanctions in roughly fourteen or so cases,ⁿ⁹⁹ researchers likely choose to include unilateral, bilateral, and regional sanctions episodes in order to obtain a larger study population for multivariate statistical analysis.ⁿ¹⁰⁰ Second, there is as of yet scant evidence to require distinguishing UN instituted sanctions from other sanction regimes.ⁿ¹⁰¹ And finally, Cortright and Lopez find an effectiveness rate of 36% in qualitatively evaluating eleven cases of UN imposed sanctions.ⁿ¹⁰² As a result, the first stated shortcoming should probably not cause undue vexation.

The second claimed weakness of the empirical research is that studies measure the success of sanctions by focusing exclusively on the stated policy mandate of the sanctions regime, while ignoring the other purposes that sanctions may serve.ⁿ¹⁰³ As stated by Cortright and Lopez: "The [*119] calculation of [sanctions] effectiveness is a highly complex and nuanced process that must take into account all the purposes that sanctions may serve, stated and unstated, instrumental and symbolic. Such a process does not lend itself to convenient quantification or simple conclusions of success or failure."ⁿ¹⁰⁴ Granted, the highly idiosyncratic process required to define a reflective measure of sanctions success is a valid argument. Numerous scholars have expended research efforts to explain the ostensibly modest success rate of empirical studies on sanctions. For instance, a sampling of the proffered accounts that explicate the difficulty in defining sanctions success via the stated sanctions mandate are: sanctions are applied to a target state over time, and the initial objectives of the sanctions regime may shift or change;ⁿ¹⁰⁵ measuring sanctions success or failure depends largely upon what point in time the sanctions program is analyzed and which of the evolving sanctions objectives are used as the stated measure of effectiveness;ⁿ¹⁰⁶ sanctions regimes may be kept in place to satisfy secondary goals, although the initial policy mandate was met--or the initial goal may not be met, while the latter goal is achieved;ⁿ¹⁰⁷ and measuring sanctions effectiveness depends primarily upon recognizing that the individual goals of the states supporting the sanctions program may differ from the sanctions regime's stated mandate.ⁿ¹⁰⁸

Even though each of these explanations appears to have some explanatory power, it would seem that the first three accounts could be systematically addressed through quantitative or qualitative methodological research design. For example, the IIE Study coded sanctions programs for other than full successes,ⁿ¹⁰⁹ and the eleven UN sanctions cases analyzed by Cortright and Lopez were scrutinized in sufficient detail to allow the researchers to discern temporal aspects to defining "success" as well as any evolving [*120] program objectives.ⁿ¹¹⁰ And finally, even a detail as seemingly nuanced as the ulterior motives of participating sanctioning states identified in the last account has been recognized by scholars when exploring a sanctions program ex-post.ⁿ¹¹¹ Notwithstanding, there is one remaining explanation that has the potential to shed light upon the sanctions effectiveness conundrum: sanctions are sometimes imposed with the symbolic function of threatening a target state with stronger, more coercive measures if the target does not alter its aberrant policies.ⁿ¹¹² Again, this aspect of sanctions research has not gone unrecognized, as the IIE Study coded five cases where sanctions were threatened but not imposed.ⁿ¹¹³ However, when one considers that the IIE Study coded only five out of 116 cases (roughly 4%) that met the "threat" characteristic,ⁿ¹¹⁴ the question that beckons an answer is: How many successful sanctions cases exist where the threat of sanctions alone accounts for the regime's success?

V. THREAT THEORY

The term "threat" has a pejorative connotation in terms of ordinary language usage, but threats, nevertheless, remain an indispensable part of political maneuvering. ⁿ¹¹⁵ Threats can be understood as "an actors' credible communication of interest, capacity, and contingent intention; they are designed to warn another actor that if it does not desist from or adjust certain behaviour, more destructive instruments will be applied." ⁿ¹¹⁶ In essence, a sanctions threat is designed to change the attitude or behavior of a target, and such threats effectively accomplish their objectives in two stages. Initially, during the "communication stage" the sanctioner relays the credible communication of the capacity and intention to carry out a particular set of actions if the target does not comply with the sanction program's mandate. ⁿ¹¹⁷ Next, during the "application stage" sanctions are [*121] actually instituted against the recipient of the threat. ⁿ¹¹⁸ According to Chesterman and Pouligny, although empirical research is lacking on the matter, the greatest point of leverage enjoyed by the international community in sanctioning a target state is just before sanctions are imposed; ⁿ¹¹⁹ in other words, leverage is greatest during the communication stage. ⁿ¹²⁰ This allegation gibes with the view taken by Professor Elizabeth R. DeSombre, who states: "As any student of deterrence knows, the most successful threat is the one that never has to be imposed." ⁿ¹²¹

If leverage is presumed to be greatest during the communication stage, then before sanctions are actually imposed upon a target state, it stands to reason that this temporal phase offers the greatest potential for sanctions success. As a result, it logically follows that there are likely many sanctions threats that never reach the application stage because the threat of sanctions alone is enough to cause the target to modify its sanctioned behavior. This deduction is cogently explained and attributed to the modest success rate of sanctions regimes in the extant empirical research by game theorists. Game theoretic approaches to studying the outcome of economic sanctions programs argue that because of the strategic interaction process involved between the sender and target, one will observe the majority of failures, but miss the bulk of successes. ⁿ¹²² A brief narrative of the game theoretic logic will substantiate this claim.

According to Professor Dean Lacy and Professor Emerson M.S. Niou, in a game involving complete information, a sanctions regime should never be instituted. ⁿ¹²³ When a sender decides to impose sanctions upon a target state, the sender will know whether the sanctions will succeed or fail, as will the target that is being sanctioned. In a state of equilibrium, a target state that is ever willing to change its illicit behavior in response to sanctions will do so at the mere threat of a sanctions imposition. A coercer will threaten to sanction a target only when the target will immediately comply, but will neither threaten nor impose sanctions in scenarios [*122] where the target will not comply. Thus, in a world of complete information, one would never observe the imposition of sanctions. ⁿ¹²⁴

What the game theoretic model implies for students of sanctions is that there is probably a serious problem in the current empirical literature on sanctions effectiveness regarding the matter of threat observation. Because a sanctions threat that is successful never reaches the application stage, there is a significant possibility that selection bias has significantly impacted the existing research on the effectiveness of sanctions. ⁿ¹²⁵ For example, in the IIE Study only five of the 116 cases ended at the threat communication stage, but four of these five cases were considered successes; this result translates into an 80% success rate for sanctions that ended at the communication stage. ⁿ¹²⁶ Obviously, this small number of non-randomly selected cases can hardly be considered indisputable evidence of pervasive empirical selection bias affecting the outcome of sanctions studies, but when considered in combination with a more recent study by Professor Daniel W. Drezner, this conjecture's plausibility becomes much more compelling.

In order to substantiate the claim of the selection bias problem, Drezner analyzed a total of 195 cases of sanctions across three categories of U.S. economic coercion-trade concessions, labor standards, and environmental protection-where both the threat of sanctions and sanctions imposition were observable. ⁿ¹²⁷ His study concluded that the threat of sanctions [*123] produced a much higher success rate than when sanctions were actually imposed. ⁿ¹²⁸ Overall, sanctions were not imposed in 69% of the 195 cases, and the success rate in these cases was 66.7%, as opposed to a success rate of 41.7% when sanctions were instituted. ⁿ¹²⁹ The most striking results occurred in the category of environmental protection, where the threat of sanctions produced a 92% success rate, compared to 52% success rate when sanctions were actually imposed. ⁿ¹³⁰ The findings from Drezner's study are not conclusive regarding the power of a sanctions threat, but the results do adequately support the claim that selection bias likely exists in the extant empirical sanctions literature. More importantly, however, the empirical challenge is not only to identify these cases-as

there is some difficulty in identifying events that end at the threat stage-but also to better comprehend the mechanism that makes the threat of sanctions a potent tool of international policy enforcement.

VI. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF POWER

Professor Desombre notes that students of sanctions cannot overlook the role that power plays in international regulation, as many scholars see power as the main determinant of action.ⁿ¹³¹ In fact, some commentators assert that when it comes to the topic of sanctions and their ability to achieve compliance, the issue boils down to one of hegemony; the strong will impose its will upon the weak.ⁿ¹³² This notion of power derives from a variety of sender state characteristics, including military strength, population size, territorial mass, natural resource endowment, economy size and growth trends, political stability, and even culture and ideology.ⁿ¹³³ Yet, Reisman and Stevick observe that the terms "strong" and "weak" [*124] misconstrue the fluid nature of power, which by definition can be founded upon a general or transitory power-superiority.ⁿ¹³⁴ As these scholars note, any disparity in power can provide the basis for the design and application of an economic sanctions program, which implies that even though economic sanctions are not equal opportunity tools of enforcement, they are not limited to use by the greatest states against the smallest states. Ostensibly, their analysis appears more cogent because it does not view the distribution of power in static terms (i.e., strong states versus weak states), but in reality, the argument simply states that even a strong state can be momentarily weak, while a weak state can be momentarily strong, making a stronger state vulnerable to a weaker state's demands.
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Regrettably, these arguments fail to provide a full accounting for the use of power in the case of a sanctions threat because they employ a functional analysis of the power concept, which grounds sanctions predictions in economic lines of argumentation. The analytic focus is on economic costs incurred by both the sending and target states, with a prediction that "vulnerability to economic sanctions is a function of dependence on external supplies of goods or capital and on external markets for domestic products."ⁿ¹³⁶ Thus, the power of a threat is viewed as a function of the sanctioning state's market power over the target state as well as the credibility of the sender in actually implementing the threatened sanctions program.ⁿ¹³⁷ And though there is a reasonable basis for policymakers to expect that the sender's market power and resolve can impact the effectiveness of a sanctions threat, these factors alone do not adequately predict the success or failure of a sanctions regime. Scholars and policymakers must recall the basic understanding of power as defined in the international relations literature: Power is the ability of some actor A to get some other actor B to do something that B would not otherwise do.ⁿ¹³⁸ As this definition hints, "power is a complex and multi-faceted concept, and it is important to be specific about the different factors that might be relevant in considering power as an explanation for anything."ⁿ¹³⁹

The alleged flaw in the economic sanctions literature is that its focus on economic impressions of power in an attempt to explicate the success or failure of a sanctions program risks confounding the policy objectives of the sanctions regime (the "ends") with the sanctions tool (the [*125] "means").ⁿ¹⁴⁰ Cortright and Lopez state, "If the foundations of a given policy are flawed, the sanctions used to carry out that policy will fail."ⁿ¹⁴¹ What this statement implies is that a sound policy can be accomplished even if the economic sanctions tool is ineffective. For example, one factor that can play a role in a threatened sanctions program's outcome is target state self-interest.ⁿ¹⁴² A target state can ask itself what benefits it will obtain by complying with a threatened sanctions program. If the target state determines that the underlying policy objectives are advantageous, then it may comply with the sanctions threat, not because it fears the impact of the economic sanctions tool, but because it has accepted the sanctioner's policy mandate. Consequently, an analytic focus solely on the power of the economic sanctions instrument will not explain why the sanctions program succeeded.

By recognizing this insight, it becomes evident that the sanctions literature is on the right path in theorizing that power plays a role in the eventual success or failure of a sanctions program. Yet, rather than relying on a one-dimensional understanding of state power as derived from general or transitory economic imbalance, which in turn drives the power and effectiveness of a sanctions threat through the use of an economic sanctions tool, the sanctioning state must embrace the broader concept of social psychological persuasive power in order to cause the target state to

accept the sanction program's underlying policy mandate at the threat communication stage.ⁿ¹⁴³ In short, to truly understand how power affects a sanctions program, analysts must not only understand the relational aspects of power,ⁿ¹⁴⁴ but also comprehend the psychological dimensions of the sanctions tool.ⁿ¹⁴⁵

VII. SOCIAL POWER THEORY

In 1959, social influence and its foundations were explored to arrive at a framework for power analysis in the seminal paper of John French and [*126] Bertram Raven--*The Bases of Social Power*.ⁿ¹⁴⁶ Although a number of additional power typologies and models have surfaced during the last several decades, arguably the most influential remains that of these scholars.ⁿ¹⁴⁷ The French and Raven power framework focuses on the five bases of social power--coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power--ⁿ¹⁴⁸ and is the most frequent typology used in modern power research; it would be rare not to find this framework in a power-related textbook.ⁿ¹⁴⁹ As a result, this paper avers that social power theory offers substantive utility as a policymaking tool when states threaten the imposition of an economic sanctions regime.

In order to fully support this assertion, the section first provides an abbreviated theoretical background on social power theory by discussing four concepts: psychological change; social influence; social power; and independent versus dependent system change. This initial groundwork is complex, but is required in order to fully conceptualize the operation of the social power bases. Nevertheless, the reader should neither become overly immersed in the details associated with each concept, nor labor over minor confusions. Next, the section describes each of the five bases of social power--coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power--along with examples and details regarding their application. Finally, the section concludes by applying social power theory to the 1925 border skirmish between Greece and Bulgaria, which was reconciled following the threat of sanctions by the League of Nations.

[*127] A. Theoretical Background

1. Psychological Change

French and Raven explain that power is defined in terms of influence, and influence is defined in terms of psychological change, so a discussion of their proposed framework begins with a description of change.ⁿ¹⁵⁰ Change is defined at a broad level of generality to encompass changes in behavior, attitudes, goals, values, needs, and other psychological aspects.ⁿ¹⁵¹ The researchers also employ the term "system" to refer to any part of the life space (i.e., social environment)ⁿ¹⁵² of a party.ⁿ¹⁵³ Given these basic underpinnings, psychological change is defined as any alteration to the state of some system, which shall be referred to as system *a*, over time.ⁿ¹⁵⁴ When there is an alteration made to the state of system *a* (denoted as $s(a)$), the change in system *a* (denoted as $ch(a)$) is measured as the difference between system *a*'s state at time 1 and at time 2: $ch(a) = s_2(a) - s_1(a)$.ⁿ¹⁵⁵

Because change in some system can result from numerous forces operating contemporaneously, when social force is applied to produce a system change, the desired outcome may or may not occur. For example, suppose the UNSC institutes a comprehensive economic sanctions regime against a target state in an effort to dissuade the citizenry from supporting the current government; the UNSC hopes to engender political change.ⁿ¹⁵⁶ Assume that at the same time as the sanctions regime is instituted there is a massive political movement within the state endorsing the targeted government because it supports teaching religious doctrine in schools, an issue vitally important to the state's citizenry. *Ceteris paribus*, the system change ($ch(a)$) between time 1 and time 2 might be negligible as a result of these diametric forces.

[*128] 2. Social Influence

By comprehending how change in some system *a* is measured over time, one can consider the impact of social influence on a party, referred to as P, produced by a social agent, referred to as O.ⁿ¹⁵⁷ Social influence is the effort

exerted by social agent O to change party P's attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, or behavior. ⁿ¹⁵⁸ Hence, the social influence of O on some system *a* in the life space of P is defined as the resultant force on system *a* that originates from an act of O. ⁿ¹⁵⁹ The force that is induced by O to alter the system *a* consists of two components: (1) a force to alter system *a* in the direction that O desires; and (2) an opposing resistance that results from O's act. ⁿ¹⁶⁰

The social influence that O exerts upon P can occur through a conscious or unconscious act of O. For instance, suppose that the UNSC passes a resolution condemning target state A for harboring known terrorists, and threatens the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions. Here, the UNSC intends social influence: its goal is to produce a direct effect in a system of target state A. However, this resolution might also unconsciously impact a system of state B because this state also harbors terrorists, unbeknownst to the UNSC. The effect in a system of state B was not intended by the UNSC, but it nevertheless occurred. As a result, both states A and B might expunge terrorists from their territorial jurisdictions.

Unfortunately, social influence does not always produce the desired effect in a party. In fact, French and Raven explain that social influence can produce an opposite effect from what was intended. ⁿ¹⁶¹ The eventual outcome of O's attempt to socially influence P will depend on the magnitude of the force ensuing from O's action when considered against the resisting force that is created by O's same act. In a case where O intends to socially influence P in a given direction, a resultant force created in that [*129] same direction is considered *positive influence*, whereas a resultant force created in the opposite direction is considered *negative influence*. ⁿ¹⁶²

3. Social Power

With the reader having acquired a basic understanding of psychological change and social influence, power can be defined. In brief, French and Raven state that "the strength of power of O/P in some system *a* is defined as the maximum potential ability of O to influence P in *a*." ⁿ¹⁶³ O's power is measured by the maximum possible influence that he may exert in some system *a* of P, though O may choose to exercise some level of power that is less than the full amount that O has available. ⁿ¹⁶⁴ Alternatively, power can also be defined by recalling that when O attempts to exert social influence on P, there will be a force created in the direction of O's influence attempt, and another resisting force created at the same time in the opposite direction. Power is then equal to the maximum result of these two diametric forces:

[SEE FORMULA IN ORIGINAL] ⁿ¹⁶⁵

Whenever the first component is greater than the second component, O has *positive power* over P. In contrast, whenever the first component is less than the second, O has *negative power* over P. French and Raven explain that the reason for defining the power of O over P with respect to a specified system of P is that O's power may vary from one system to another. ⁿ¹⁶⁶ For example, the UNSC may have the power to influence a target state with respect to its opinions about national policies, but the UNSC may have little power to influence the target state regarding its underlying values.

4. Independent versus Dependent System Change

Finally, now that psychological change, social influence, and power are defined, the last issue to address concerns the stability of some system *a* of P after an influence attempt by O. In other words, once O's influence creates a change in system *a* of P, how dependent is the state of system *a* of P upon O? To answer this question, French and Raven argue that in many cases the initial state of the system is characterized by a quasi-stationary [*130] equilibrium that can be labeled *s1(a)*. ⁿ¹⁶⁷ If we assume that O exerts force on P to modify the state of the system to *s2(a)*, the question is whether the state of the system at *s2(a)* is dependent on the continued presence of O. In short, the degree of dependence of *s2(a)* on O after O's influence can be understood as the amount of retrogression following the removal of O from the life space of P:

Degree of Dependence of $s_2(a)$ on $O = s_2(a) - s_3(a)$,

where $s_3(a)$ is the state of the system after O's removal. ⁿ¹⁶⁸ In order to take operational measures for the degree of system dependence on O, all other factors must be held constant.

To understand the formula, consider a simplistic example where the UNSC passes a resolution mandating biological weapons inspections in target states A and B in order to stop these states from producing dangerous arms. The UN weapons inspections begin and continue for a period of 24 months, at which point the weapons inspections cease because there are no longer biological weapons manufactured in target states A or B. Immediately after the weapons inspections stop, state A begins producing biological weapons anew, while state B does not. Here, the targeted system of state A was completely dependent on the UN's presence, while the targeted system of state B was not. One potential explanation for the outcome is that target state B's system internalized a social norm against biological weapons, while target state A's system did not internalize a normative change, but instead was completely dependent upon the external presence of UN weapons inspectors.

B. Bases of Social Power

The source of power in a relationship between O and P is considered a base of power, and in a typical relationship there will be several power bases. ⁿ¹⁶⁹ Although there are probably numerous power sources that could be defined in a power framework, French and Raven identify five important sources of O's power over P: (1) coercive power, based on P's perception that O has the ability to mediate punishments; (2) reward power, based on P's understanding that O has the ability to mediate rewards; [*131] (3) legitimate power, based on P's perception that O has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior; (4) referent power, based on P's identification with O; and (5) expert power, based on P's belief that O has specialized knowledge or expertise. ⁿ¹⁷⁰

In the following section, each power base is defined along with its related characteristics, including the power's strength, range of use, and type of change produced in a targeted system (i.e., independent versus dependent change). At appropriate junctures, the segment also discusses how a power's exercise will affect the relationship between O and P. Lastly, the section periodically highlights some of the complex interrelationships among the five power bases.

1. Coercive Power

The coercive power of O/P (i.e., O over P) stems from P's expectation that it will be punished by O if P fails to conform to O's influence attempt. ⁿ¹⁷¹ The strength of the coercive power will depend on the magnitude of the threatened punishment as perceived by P multiplied by the probability that P can avoid the punishment by conforming (i.e., the probability of punishment for not conforming minus the probability of punishment for conforming). ⁿ¹⁷² In less formal terms, the more that P fears punishment for noncompliance, the greater the coercive power of O. As might be anticipated, one of the key issues with coercive power is that it frequently leads to dependent change in a system, where the degree of dependence varies with O's ability to observe P's conformity. ⁿ¹⁷³ In short, once O can no longer punish P, P will have no incentive to comply; P will also have no incentive to comply if O cannot detect P's noncompliance. This definition of coercive power supports the claim made by Cortright and Lopez that enforcing sanctions and ensuring compliance are the keys to sanctions effectiveness, not whether the imposed sanctions are comprehensive or targeted. ⁿ¹⁷⁴

French and Raven note that one must be careful to distinguish between coercive power and reward power because their dynamics are much different. [*132] ⁿ¹⁷⁵ These dynamics are evident in the effects produced in the targeted system of P by the exertion of coercive influence; coercive power will always result in dependent system change, unlike reward power, which may eventually create an independent system change (this change occurs through referent power). ⁿ¹⁷⁶ The threat of coercive power will also decrease the attraction of P to O, unlike reward power, which will increase the attraction. ⁿ¹⁷⁷ Moreover, a threatened punishment by O on P can create a resultant force on P to leave the range within which the threatened punishment impacts. In other words, coercive power creates an incentive for P to hide

noncompliance in order to avoid the threatened punishment. ⁿ¹⁷⁸ In the context of a coercive sanctions regime, the target state is likely to create circumvention strategies to avoid the sanction regime's bite. ⁿ¹⁷⁹ As a result, the sanctioner must create other restraining forces in order to keep the target from withdrawing completely from the sanctioner's range of coercive power. Otherwise, the probability of the target receiving punishment for nonconformity will be too low to make the coercive influence attempt effective. ⁿ¹⁸⁰

The utilization of coercive power can also cause an interaction effect with legitimate power. If O threatens punishment against P for nonconformity with its influence attempt, and P perceives that O does not have legitimate power to threaten coercion, or if P believes that O has legitimate power to coerce but is acting in an illegitimate manner, P will either refuse to conform, or conform at a lower level, and the level of attraction that P has for O will be more diminished than is expected when coercive power is exercised legitimately. ⁿ¹⁸¹

2. Reward Power

Reward power is power based upon the ability of O to reward P for conforming to O's influence. ⁿ¹⁸² The strength of reward power of O/P increases with the magnitude of the rewards that P believes that O can mediate, as well as with the probability that O can mediate rewards, as [*133] perceived by P. ⁿ¹⁸³ The new state of a system of P that is induced by the promise of reward will be highly dependent on O, as O controls the probability that P will receive the reward, but the state of the system over time may become independent (this change occurs through referent power). ⁿ¹⁸⁴ Thus, the level of P's compliance generated by the promise of reward will depend on P's subjective probability that O will reward P for conformity minus P's subjective probability that O will reward him even without conformity. As one might expect, these probabilities will be highly dependent on O's ability to observe P's behavior, ⁿ¹⁸⁵ which will motivate P to make O aware of its compliance. ⁿ¹⁸⁶ French and Raven's definition of reward power concurs with William J. Long's view that in the realm of international statecraft, rewards create stakeholders in the target state with an incentive to continue engagement; ⁿ¹⁸⁷ the target may wish to have its activities monitored if the subjective probability of garnering rewards without observed conformity is low, and the target may also hope to create the opportunity to obtain further rewards for duly complying.

By utilizing actual rewards, as compared to promises, O can generate the attraction of P to O over time, and thereby generate the referent power of O over P. ⁿ¹⁸⁸ However, the range of reward power is restricted to those regions within which O can reward P for conformity. By rewarding P within this range O can increase the probability P attaches to future promises, but failing to reward P, or attempting to exert reward power outside its range, will tend to decrease O's reward power over P. ⁿ¹⁸⁹

Finally, neither rewards nor promises should create any resistance in P, provided that P perceives O to have the legitimate power to offer rewards. Here, as with coercive power, there can be an interaction effect with legitimate power. In sum, O's attempt to exercise reward power over P can generate strong resistance if P believes that O does not have the legitimate power to exercise reward power, or if P perceives that O is acting in a manner that connotes illegitimacy. ⁿ¹⁹⁰ In such a case, a reward might be viewed as a bribe or payoff attempt.

[*134] 3. Legitimate Power

French and Raven note that legitimate power is the most complicated base of social power. ⁿ¹⁹¹ They define the legitimate power of O/P "as that power which stems from internalized values in P which dictate that O has a legitimate right to influence P and that P has an obligation to accept this influence. ⁿ¹⁹² Legitimacy has long been studied by sociologists, such as Max Weber, and the definition proposed here is quite similar. ⁿ¹⁹³ However, unlike Weber's definition of authoritative legitimacy, the legitimate base of power does not always have its source in a role relationship. ⁿ¹⁹⁴ Instead, a base of legitimate power can result from a promise that P has made to O; because P values his promise, he will not violate it.

In brief, the notion of legitimacy involves some type of code or standard, accepted by P, through which O can exert

power. The source of legitimate power can be cultural values, social structure and hierarchy, or even designation by a legitimizing agent. ⁿ¹⁹⁵ For an example of legitimate power by designation, consider the case of the UN and East Timor. After East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia, violence swept the island in September of 1999. ⁿ¹⁹⁶ The UNSC authorized an Australian-led multinational force to restore peace in East Timor, and the plan was approved by Indonesia. ⁿ¹⁹⁷ Shortly after on October 15, the UNSC established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to assist East Timor with stabilization, as well as in developing the democratic process. ⁿ¹⁹⁸ In this case, the UN had the legitimate authority to intervene, and UNTAET had legitimate power by designation.

French and Raven's definition of legitimacy supports Professor DeSombre's argument that legitimacy plays an important role in persuading states to adopt policies. ⁿ¹⁹⁹ She further asserts that legitimacy in the international policy realm involves not only the legitimacy of a request [*135] made upon a target state, but also the legitimacy of the method by which a social agent tries to persuade the target. ⁿ²⁰⁰ These claims concur with French and Raven, who state that the range of legitimate power of O/P is generally specified along with the designation of that power. ⁿ²⁰¹ Although a range of power can be quite broad in the cultural context, the typical range of legitimate power is specifically and narrowly prescribed. In addition, any attempt to exert power outside of the legitimate range will decrease the legitimate power of O, and will also decrease O's attractiveness to P. ⁿ²⁰² For example, the UN Charter narrowly prescribes the legitimate power that the UNSC may exercise, ⁿ²⁰³ and attempts to exercise power beyond this range would be viewed as suspect by UN member states. If the UNSC were to pass a resolution condemning certain religious views, it would be exercising power outside of its legitimate range, and the majority of UN member states would likely become disenchanted with the UNSC.

The new state of some system a of P that results from legitimate power will probably have a high dependence on O, although it may become independent if P's system comes to rely more on P's internal values as opposed to those induced by O. ⁿ²⁰⁴ O's observation of P's activities does not play a role in dependent and independent system change. There are potential interaction effects between legitimacy and coercive power or reward power, which were previously mentioned. Note however, in cases where legitimacy is lacking, exercising coercive power or reward power will not only decrease the attractiveness of O to P, but also increase the amount of resistance by P from O's influence attempt. ⁿ²⁰⁵ Sanctions commentators have alluded to such possible interaction effects, as when Cortright and Lopez averred that sanctions effectiveness is enhanced when credible civil society groups and human rights organizations in a target country legitimate the imposition of sanctions. ⁿ²⁰⁶ The underlying message in such claims is that economic sanctions success is determined by more than coercion; success is also determined by the legitimacy of the coercive acts.

4. Referent Power

French and Raven explain that "the referent power of O/P has its basis in the identification of P with O." ⁿ²⁰⁷ The use of the term identification [*136] implies a feeling of oneness of P with O; it is P's desire to obtain such an identity. In short, referent power derives from P's satisfaction in believing or behaving in ways consistent with the beliefs or behaviors of O, which is typically a reference group. ⁿ²⁰⁸ For instance, if O is an attractive or prestigious group, P will have a feeling of membership or a desire to join the group. ⁿ²⁰⁹ And once P becomes associated with O, P will want to maintain this relationship. P's identification with O is established or maintained if P acts, believes, and perceives in a manner similar to O, which implies that O has the ability to influence P even though O is not cognizant of this referent power. ⁿ²¹⁰ For instance, a state may find UN membership desirable, so it will strive to become accepted as a UN member. ⁿ²¹¹ To become accepted, the state will emulate the behavior and policies that are widely endorsed by the UN and its current members, and if accepted for membership, the state will continue to exemplify these characteristics. As a result, beliefs or actions of the UN General Assembly can impact the policies of this state, even though the UN may not be conscious of its influence.

Referent power is probably the broadest power base, but it is also easy to confuse with other types of power that might operate concurrently. ⁿ²¹² The basic way to distinguish referent power from coercive power and reward power is to determine whether O mediates control over P; if so, O has coercive or reward power. ⁿ²¹³ For instance, if P is

attracted to O and conforms with O because P fears punishment or hopes to obtain a reward, this would be a case of coercive power or reward power, respectively. In contrast, if P avoids discomfort or gains satisfaction solely based upon identification with O, regardless of O's actions, then this scenario would be a case of referent power. Note too, referent power can also be confused with expert power. ⁿ²¹⁴ If P follows the opinion of O because O is a group comprised of members with key knowledge on a certain matter, O would have expert power. In contrast, if conformity with O's opinion is based on P's identification with O, O has referent power.

The level of attraction and level of referent power are directly related, though if this attraction has a specific and narrow basis, the range of the [*137] referent power will be more limited. ⁿ²¹⁵ For example, if a state identifies with the UN because it is a prestigious international actor in global affairs, and the state garners some innate satisfaction from an association with the UN, the UN will probably have referent power over the state on global affairs matters, but considerably less referent power on other issues, such as religious views. Referent power can produce either a dependent or independent change in some system a of P, but this change does not depend on O's observation of P's activities. ⁿ²¹⁶ Because P is not normally aware of the referent power that O is able to exercise, the tendency is probably for system change to become independent. ⁿ²¹⁷

From an interaction effects perspective, attraction is the key component of referent power. French and Raven aver that greater attraction produces greater identification, which means that O's exercise of coercive power over P tends to decrease attraction and thereby referent power, and O's exertion of reward power over P tends to increase attraction and thereby referent power. ⁿ²¹⁸ These relationships are important because referent power is often unconsciously exercised by O over P, and to the extent that the excessive use of coercive power creates in P a disdain for O, O may unconsciously exert negative referent power over P. ⁿ²¹⁹ For example, if the UNSC continuously threatens coercion against a target state, the target state may grow to detest the UN, and thus begin to act in a way that directly contradicts the manner in which the state would act if the UN had positive referent power over the state.

5. Expert Power

The strength of the expert power of O/P varies with the level of the knowledge that P attributes to O in a given realm. ⁿ²²⁰ In brief, expert power originates from P attributing superior knowledge, skills, or abilities to O. ⁿ²²¹ Professor Donelson R. Forsyth explains that in general, the larger the gap between the expertise of the social agent and the target party, the greater the expert power of the social agent over the target. ⁿ²²² Expert power has been studied and demonstrated experientially. ⁿ²²³ For instance, expert power is conceptually linked to findings in the area of persuasive communication, which conclude that the persuasiveness of a communication [*138] depends upon the expertise and trustworthiness of the communicator. ⁿ²²⁴ Thus, expert power depends not only on P believing that O has expert knowledge, but also on P's belief that O is truthful. ⁿ²²⁵ As an example, the UNSC might want to assist a newly independent state-such as in the East Timor case-with a transitional administration. But if this new state and its predecessor both have severely strained relations with the US, even though the new state may believe that the UN has expert knowledge in state-building, the UN may not have expert power over the new state because the state does not trust the US, which is a permanent member of the UNSC.

Expert power can be subdivided between expert power and information power, with expert power being held by O because of specific knowledge P attributes to O, and informational power being the actual persuasive content of the communication from O to P. ⁿ²²⁶ This distinction is not drawn in the original work of French and Raven, but academics and policymakers should be cognizant of the difference between these two powers. ⁿ²²⁷ Expert power generally results in dependent system change because P depends on a continued relationship with O, while information power typically produces independent system change because a change in some system a of P is produced through cognitive processes triggered by information influence. ⁿ²²⁸ In addition, neither expert power nor information power requires that O observe P's behavior. ⁿ²²⁹ And lastly, the range of both expert power and information power is generally narrowly delimited, though at times expert power can produce a "halo effect" on O, providing O with expert power in other realms. Generally, however, the attempted use of expert power outside of its range will produce a decrease in the expert power of O/P. ⁿ²³⁰

C. Sanctions Threat Case -- League of Nations v. Greece

The following section represents a concise analysis of social power theory and the five bases of social power—coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power—in the context of a [*139] successful threat by the League of Nations (LON) against Greece following a border skirmish between Bulgaria and Greece in 1925. A comprehensive and detailed application of the model is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the purpose here is to illustrate how application of the social bases of power beyond coercion can serve to explicate the success or failure of a threatened sanctions imposition. The section begins with a brief description of the dispute between Bulgaria and Greece. Next, the bases of social power are applied to the dispute in order to explain the success of the LON sanctions threat. Finally, the section concludes with a brief summary of the findings.

1. The Border Skirmish

On Monday, October 19, 1925, fighting broke out on the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria.ⁿ²³¹ The immediate account of what partook was confused and contradictory. According to the Bulgarians, the trouble commenced in a mountainous area near Demirkapu, when a Greek soldier advanced into Bulgarian territory and fired shots at a Bulgarian outpost soldier, who fired back in self-defense and killed the Greek soldier.ⁿ²³² This killing provoked a general exchange of fire between the two sides and fighting ensued for several hours. In contrast, according to the Greeks, it was the Bulgarians who had attacked Greek outposts, killing a Greek soldier, as well as a Greek officer who had advanced under a white flag in an attempt to negotiate.ⁿ²³³ As a result of this frontier skirmish, Greek troops moved into Bulgarian territory, supported by air artillery and air campaign bombing.ⁿ²³⁴ The Greek advance threatened the town of Petric, which was protected only by the townspeople and a few hundred soldiers.ⁿ²³⁵

On the morning of October 23 the Bulgarian government appealed by telegram to the LON Secretary-General,ⁿ²³⁶ specifically invoking Articles 10ⁿ²³⁷ and 11ⁿ²³⁸ of the Covenant of the LON.ⁿ²³⁹ The Secretary-General [*140] convoked an emergency meeting of the LON Council, and within a few short hours the Council President sent a telegram response to Sofia (Bulgaria) and Athens (Greece), calling upon both countries to cease fighting immediately and withdraw their troops behind their respective frontiers.ⁿ²⁴⁰ This telegram message confined itself only to the cessation of hostilities, and did not address the rights or wrongs of the parties.ⁿ²⁴¹ Unbeknownst to the LON Council, the telegram arrived in Athens at an opportune time, as the Greek commander was preparing to launch a major offensive against Petric.ⁿ²⁴² Both sides were angry and ready to fight, and preventing another Greco-Bulgarian war would have been extremely difficult if the town had been attacked.ⁿ²⁴³ Fortunately, the telegram prompted the Greek government to halt the invasion.ⁿ²⁴⁴

The LON Council met in Paris two days later and approved the action taken by the President.ⁿ²⁴⁵ The crisis was now past its peak, but the situation remained volatile and dangerous.ⁿ²⁴⁶ Because hostile forces were still in contact with each other, and skirmishing continued, the Council's first demand was that these confrontations cease.ⁿ²⁴⁷ Therefore, the Council asked both governments to inform it within 24 hours that unconditional orders had been issued to all troops to withdraw, and within 60 hours, that troops had actually withdrawn, all hostilities had ceased, and each government had warned all troops that resumed fighting would be severely punished.ⁿ²⁴⁸ In order to assist the Council with this request, the governments of France, Britain, and Italy were to send military officers to inform the Council when the terms of the request were fulfilled.ⁿ²⁴⁹ Until it had received assurances on these points, the Council refused to listen to legal and moral justifications from either side.ⁿ²⁵⁰

[*141] Austen Chamberlain, of Britain, declared that it would be an affront to civilization if the two states, with the machinery of the LON at their disposal, allowed the incident to lead to warlike operations rather than submitting the matter to the Council.ⁿ²⁵¹ Hence, the Council laid plans for the enforcement of its resolution. There was talk of a naval demonstration, as well as the imposition of sanctions against Greece under Article 16ⁿ²⁵² of the Covenant.ⁿ²⁵³ As luck would have it, these threats did not have to be carried out; when the LON-appointed military officers reached the point of conflict, the withdrawal had already commenced, and it was completed well within the Council's allotted time limit.ⁿ²⁵⁴

As was usual for this type of conflict, the Council decided to send a Commission of Inquiry to the spot of the conflict, with instructions to report on the rights and wrongs in the case, as well as to make suggestions on how to prevent further conflicts. ⁿ²⁵⁵ Furthermore, because Greece and Bulgaria both demanded reparations from one another, the Commission was empowered to consider all such claims and propose a final settlement. ⁿ²⁵⁶ The Council obtained assurance from both parties that it would accept and carry out its decision, whatever the outcome. ⁿ²⁵⁷

When the Council reconvened in December, it reviewed the Commission's report, which found there was blame on both sides for the original incident. ⁿ²⁵⁸ However, after the Greek officer with the white flag was [*142] killed, Greece had inappropriately taken the law into its own hands. As a result, Greece was ordered to pay an indemnity to Bulgaria of £ 45,000 because its invasion had killed numerous Bulgarian soldiers and civilians, and destroyed many homes and crops. ⁿ²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in making the indemnity calculation, the Council had allowed for an indemnity to Greece for its officer's death. The Commission also suggested that two neutral officers be appointed to serve on either side of the frontier, in order to settle any future quarrels. ⁿ²⁶⁰ As might have been expected, neither country was completely satisfied with the adjudication, but they each accepted it. ⁿ²⁶¹

2. Explaining the Threat's Success

The IIE Study codes the threat of sanctions in the LON versus Greece as a significant success--the highest possible score. ⁿ²⁶² After reviewing the brief historical overview, the reader is probably in agreement with the IIE Study's conclusion. However, in the case of the LON sanctions threat against Greece, it seems unlikely that the threat of coercion was the sole cause of the threat's effectiveness. In fact, the more likely scenario is that each base of social power had a role in securing compliance from Greece. ⁿ²⁶³ Thus, an analysis of each of the five bases of social power in the context of the dispute is required.

First, there is no question that when the LON threatened a naval demonstration and economic sanctions against Greece if it did not abide by the LON resolution, this threat represented an exercise of coercive power by the LON against Greece. At the time, Greece was in a fragile economic state, ⁿ²⁶⁴ and it likely feared the impact of an economic sanctions regime. Although coercive power leads to dependent change in the target, in this case coercion would have been effective because Greece was a member of the LON, and it would be difficult for Greece to invade Bulgaria, another LON member, without attracting the attention of the LON. ⁿ²⁶⁵ Of course, Greece could have attempted to withdraw its membership from the LON in an effort to avoid sanctions if it decided not to comply with the LON resolution. And an unanswered question is whether the LON's exercise of coercive power reduced the level of attraction that Greece felt for [*143] the LON; more detailed research would be required to make this determination.

Second, the LON probably had legitimate power in this matter. Because there can be an interaction effect between coercive power and legitimate power, coercive power could have failed in this case if Greece did not believe that the LON had the legitimate power to threaten coercion. Yet, because the LON was exercising the authority vested in it by the Covenant, and Greece was an original party to the Covenant, ⁿ²⁶⁶ the LON had legitimate power to act in this matter, and did not exceed its range of legitimate power. In addition, because the LON appointed the Commission that investigated the dispute between Bulgaria and Greece after the cessation of hostilities, ⁿ²⁶⁷ the Commission also possessed legitimate power by designation from the LON. What is more, because Greece was an original member of the LON, its internal values were likely similar to the LON, which meant that Greece was probably not dependent on the LON's ongoing influence to maintain its behavior. ⁿ²⁶⁸ Lastly, because Greece was a current member of the LON, its legitimating influence would have remained extant.

Third, the LON likely had some level of referent power, although the LON may or may not have been aware of this social power base. Greece was an original member of the LON, and as such, probably wanted to maintain its membership in the body during this time period. This desire would require Greece to act, believe, and perceive in a manner similar to the LON. ⁿ²⁶⁹ In this case, continuing to march across Bulgaria in direct violation of the Covenant would not have been reasonable behavior for a LON member. Yet, referent power is a murky issue in this matter, as Greece may have sought to identify with the LON because Greece received a certain level of comfort from

identification with the LON (referent power), but also may have complied with the LON's mandate because the LON could mediate a reward or punishment (reward power or coercive power, respectively) or provide expert assistance (expert power).ⁿ²⁷⁰ It seems likely that referent power had some role in the event; as is the case with many UN members today, there is a certain level of comfort in belonging and identifying with this type of global organization. Notwithstanding, even if the LON did possess a base of referent power, by threatening sanctions against Greece, the LON may have decreased its attractiveness to Greece, and thereby its ongoing referent power.

[*144] Fourth, the LON probably had both expert power and information power in this dispute. The LON possessed expert power and acted within its expert power range; the LON Council was specifically charged with settling disputes between states pursuant to Article 12 of the Covenant.ⁿ²⁷¹ Thus, as an original member of the LON, Greece likely believed the LON possessed the expertise to settle state disputes because it had agreed to the terms of the Covenant. In this matter, appearances suggest that Greece believed the Council was both credible and trustworthy to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, as a continuing member of the LON, the fact that expert power would have produced dependent change in Greece's behavior does not appear to be a concern; as an influencing agent, the LON would have a continued presence. What is more, this worry is likely mitigated by the informational power contained in the report of the Commission that had been appointed to investigate the conflict. In short, if one assumes that Greece was influenced by the persuasive content of the report, then Greece's behavioral change would not have been wholly dependent on the LON's expert power.ⁿ²⁷² As with many of the other more vexing issues surrounding the crisis, whether or not this assumption holds would require a more scrutinizing analysis.

3. Summary

The 1925 dispute between Greece and Bulgaria was adequately managed by the LON's threat of sanctions against the aggressor party-Greece. However, as opposed to the typical explanation proffered by sanctions commentators, which is that coercive economic sanctions produced a favorable outcome, the results of this concise analysis suggest that other social bases of power were utilized to settle the dispute via the threat of sanctions. In addition to the LON's exercise of coercive power, there is observable evidence of legitimate power and expert power, and a plausible claim for the existence of referent power.

[*145] The only social power base the LON did not utilize in the context of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute was reward power.ⁿ²⁷³ Although it is possible Greece believed that by ceasing hostilities with Bulgaria the LON would reward it by forcing Bulgaria to meet its "satisfaction demands,"ⁿ²⁷⁴ this assumption appears dubious. There is no tangible evidence that the LON gave Greece such an impression at any point during the dispute.

In summary, this brief case study illustrates that the five social bases of power offer substantive utility and parsimony in understanding why a sanctions threat is effective in achieving a desired end. The results of the analysis provide a clear and cogent explanation for the sanctions threat's results. Nevertheless, the results do not imply that there were not other factors that may have contributed to the effectiveness of the LON sanctions threat.ⁿ²⁷⁵

VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

From its beginning, this paper has progressed with a single purpose: to propose a methodology that will allow UN policymakers to more effectively achieve their goals when it becomes necessary to threaten sanctions against a target state. Through both a theoretical discussion and qualitative case analysis, this article has demonstrated that social power theory provides such a tool kit for academics and policymakers alike. At this juncture, the key is to make useful policymaking suggestions that can improve the effectiveness of future multilateral sanctions threats. From the outset, the UN must recognize that each base of social power can influence the outcome of a sanctions threat. Therefore, the UN must be cautious when exercising coercive power because of its integral shortcomings, and should consider utilizing a mixed influence strategy involving coercive power and reward power in appropriate circumstances (i.e., sticks and carrots). Alternatively, there may be contexts where employing coercive power is ill-advised, and a substitute base of social power is preferred, such as reward power alone. Finally, the UN must acknowledge the peril in changing

the terms of compliance for a target state after a sanctions threat is communicated; such changes not only diminishes the chance of the sanctions threat succeeding, but can also impede the UN's social bases of power in the future. Although this discussion is directed at UN imposed multilateral sanctions, these recommendations should apply, *a fortiori*, to other sanctions regimes.

[*146] To begin, the evidence suggests that Cortright and Lopez are on the right track in arguing that sanctions should be viewed as tools of persuasion, which are most effective when applied in a policy context where sticks (punishments) and carrots (rewards) are utilized jointly to bring about a problem resolution.ⁿ²⁷⁶ These researchers state that "a sanctions policy can become counterproductive when it leans too heavily on punitive pressures, with little or no prospect for positive incentives."ⁿ²⁷⁷ Their argument is supported by the negative effects associated with influence via the coercive base of social power, which include: dependent change in the target that requires ongoing observation by the sanctioner; incentive creation in the target to circumvent the influence attempt as well as to hide noncompliance; decreased target attraction for the sanctioner; and an increased risk of failure if the target perceives that the sanctioner does not have the legitimate power to sanction, or is behaving in an illegitimate manner.ⁿ²⁷⁸ Given these potential shortcomings, it may be unsurprising to learn that a study comparing 22 cases of influence attempts using coercion versus coercion and rewards found that the mixed strategy was three times more effective than coercive influence alone.ⁿ²⁷⁹ Thus, implementing a coercive sanctions program that includes a reward--such as a "sunset clause"--appears to hold substantial promise as a policy tool of social influence for the UN.ⁿ²⁸⁰

Still, the pitfalls associated with the coercive base of social power do not imply that the UN should abandon coercive influence attempts in the form of a sanctions threat. Again, reconsider the success that the LON achieved when it employed a coercive threat against Greece in the Greco-Bulgarian conflict. What the risks associated with coercion do imply is that the UN must be astutely aware of coercive power's shortcomings, especially regarding the need to monitor the target state indefinitely, as well as the increased probability of failure if the target state does not perceive that the UN has a legitimate base of social power allowing it to threaten coercion. Again, the UN must consider all the bases of social [*147] power to properly determine if it should exercise coercion. In those cases where the contextual factors speak against the use of coercive power, the UN should reevaluate its options, perhaps selecting an alternative base of social power, such as reward power.ⁿ²⁸¹ In fact, the researchers Davidson and Shambaugh claim that rewards should always be preferred to coercion when they are just as effective at generating compliance and can yield positive externalities.ⁿ²⁸² There is no question that positive externalities are an added bonus when implementing a social influence attempt, but because utilizing reward power can increase the target's attraction to the UN, which can eventually create or strengthen the UN's base of referent power over the target, thereby engendering independent changes in the target that do not require ongoing UN observation, reward power can be a superior base of influence even without positive externalities. Recognize, however, the target state must perceive that the UN has a legitimate base of social power in order to exercise reward power, otherwise the reward may be viewed as a bribe, thereby creating increased resistance in the target state.

As a final point, when the UN imposes a threat of sanctions against a target state, it must be careful to formulate a specific policy mandate ahead of time that outlines in detail what the regime is expected to accomplish, and what actions the threat is expected to garner from the target. For instance, history suggests tensions between the objectives of the UN and those of major states such as the US and Great Britain, who attempt to interpret UNSC resolutions in a manner that suits their own interests, ignoring the letter of the law as imbedded in the resolution.ⁿ²⁸³ This phenomenon has been characterized as the "moving of the goalposts" and can be a serious problem for the UN and its relationship with target states when utilizing the threat of sanctions. For example, consider a case where the UN imposes a sanction threat against a target state that contains both the threat of a punishment as well as a reward in the form of a sunset clause. If the target state succumbs quickly to the influence attempt, and [*148] several of the 5Ps subsequently modify the requirements for the threat's cessation under the sunset clause, then the positive effects associated with reward power are diminished. As a result, the UNSC's base of reward power is tarnished for the future, and its other bases of social power might also be impacted: a decreased level of target attractiveness for the UN can impact the UN's referent power base, and the fact that the target may feel that the UNSC was not truthful can impact its expert power base.ⁿ²⁸⁴

Thus, before making a sanctions threat, the UNSC must make all possible attempts at avoiding ambiguity in the sanctions mandate, despite the difficulties in reaching consensus among the UNSC members, because in the long-run resolution ambiguity can greatly hamper the UNSC's social bases of power as its members shift the "goalposts."

In sum, these cited policy implications only begin to explore the issues that the UN must consider when it attempts to exert social influence through a sanctions threat. Each of the five bases of power--coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power--all merit careful consideration before any attempt is made at social influence. Failure to consider each of the power bases, as well as their potential interaction effects, may not only defeat the purpose of the sanctions threat, but can do long-term damage to the bases of social power, thereby impacting the UN's ability to subsequently influence target states.

IX. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

There are several limitations in this analysis that provide opportunities for future research. Most notably, there are four specific points that should be addressed. First, the current argument assumes a unitary level of analysis; this assumption can be relaxed in subsequent studies. Second, extensive qualitative and quantitative studies of the social bases of power are required to substantiate social power theory as a mechanism responsible for sanctions outcomes. Third, researchers must exercise intellectual creativity in order to discover additional data on sanctions threats. And fourth, there is a wealth of opportunity for students of sanctions to rigorously explore each of the bases of social power in greater depth, as well as to apply social power theory in other sanctions-related contexts.

First, international policy research frequently confounds the levels of analysis, both intentionally and unintentionally, in theoretical discussions. For instance, Daryl J. Levinson explains that the sanctions literature tends to personify states as unitary actors, with some exceptions.ⁿ²⁸⁵ As with the literature Levinson critiques, this study, intentionally assumes the state is a unitary actor, and eschews multilevel analysis for purposes of simplicity in [*149] exploring an initial application of the five bases of social power in the context of an international sanctions threat. However, now that this article has addressed the fundamentals of social power theory, and laid the groundwork for its application, an opportunity arises for students of sanctions to begin study across levels of analysis--at the system, state, group, and individual levelsⁿ²⁸⁶--in order to determine whether the theoretical underpinnings of social power theory hold. More specifically, further rigorous literary review of the sociological, social psychological, political science, and legal literatures is required, as well as multilevel empirical studies.

Second, extensive study on the social bases of power in cases of sanctions threats must be conducted by utilizing a variety of research methods. Students of sanctions can scrutinize individual cases such as the Greco-Bulgarian dispute in more exacting detail, and can also pursue qualitative comparative case studies. For example, an initial project could compare the five cases of successful threatened sanctions that were identified in the IIE Study using social power theory. Additionally, researchers should endeavor to quantitatively analyze large data sets, aside from the IIE Study database, which has already been heavily studied. This initial work may require that academics and policymakers look beyond the UN context, to sanctions that were threatened under regional, bilateral, or unilateral regimes. For instance, Professor Daniel Drezner provides three such databases in a recent paper that are nicely suited for analytic purposes.ⁿ²⁸⁷ In short, as research progresses and an ample body of case studies, comparative qualitative analyses, and quantitative research designs comes into existence, there will be an opportunity for students to employ triangulation in order to prove or disprove the robustness of the social power theory as an explanatory model for sanctions effectiveness.

Third, the difficulty in identifying cases of threatened sanctions may force academics and policymakers to flex their creative intellect in their quest for data. As opposed to sanctions cases that can be readily isolated and singled out based upon a documented threat, researchers may need to begin canvassing sanctions cases where sanctions were imposed, not as a means of coercion, but as a symbolic threat that more hurtful sanctions would soon follow if the target state failed to meet the sanctioner's demands. Cortright and Lopez state: "At times symbolic sanctions may be imposed as an initial response to wrongdoing and as an implied threat of [*150] stronger, more coercive measures to follow if the targeted regime does not alter its policies."ⁿ²⁸⁸ Professor Emilio Cardenas identified one such case of symbolic sanctions as the

decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) to impose sanctions against Haiti in 1991. ⁿ²⁸⁹ Cortright and Lopez describe the OAS sanctions as being instituted by the international community in four distinct phases; a sort of "ratcheting up" of the sanctions' sting. ⁿ²⁹⁰ There are obviously other symbolic sanctions cases that can be analyzed, but identification will require substantive effort by the researcher.

Finally, the five social bases of power present students of sanctions with ample opportunity to further explore each power base in copious detail, as well as to apply social power theory in other sanctions-related contexts. For example, legitimate power is an important base of social power for the UN, but at this stage very little research is available on what events might impact this social power base, other than the UN exceeding its range of legitimate power as defined by the UN Charter. That said, one such impediment to the UN's legitimate power might be the egregious humanitarian costs of a comprehensive sanctions regime. If researchers determine that excessive humanitarian costs diminish the legitimate power of the UN, then a further question for study would be to what extent the UN's diminished legitimate power impacts its reward power and coercive power. Alternatively, by adopting a slightly different perspective on sanctions research, students will discover other sanctions-related areas that merit investigation. For instance, in a recent paper Professor Drezner argues that multilateral sanctions are often sabotaged by cooperative enforcement difficulties, but that international organizations are effective at mitigating this cooperation problem. ⁿ²⁹¹ Thus, an interesting question is whether the social bases of power--such as legitimate power, referent power, and expert power--can help explain why the international organization is more successful in creating cooperation in this realm than the sanctioning state.

In sum, there are limitations in the current analysis that can be remedied with additional investigation, and there are also fertile areas for future research. As scholars and policymakers investigate social power theory across multiple levels of analysis and employ additional research methods in this process, we expect that social power theory will become increasingly robust as an explanatory mechanism in the sanctions context. Furthermore, as researchers flex intellectual creativity to locate instances of [*151] sanctions threats, begin to explore the bases of social power in greater detail, and start to apply social power theory in other sanctions-related contexts, the international policymaking community stands to reap tremendous benefits.

X. CONCLUSION

Multilateral sanctions are integral tools of economic statecraft, which will likely remain favored by the UNSC in the coming years. In fact, the recent study and implementation of targeted sanctions--otherwise known as "smart sanctions"--has led some commentators to allege that the UNSC has started to make progress in the art and science of statecraft technique. ⁿ²⁹² Yet, despite these recent innovations, as well as the lengthy historical precedent that sanctions possess as policy tools, economic sanctions' purported success continues to foster lively debate among both academics and policymakers alike. An extensive array of qualitative and quantitative studies on both comprehensive and targeted sanctions regimes has failed to produce consensus among commentators on whether sanctions effectively meet their policy mandates.

This Article claims that the confusion on whether sanctions do or do not work as international policy tools does not result from implementation problems, compliance concerns, or humanitarian impacts, though these factors may play a role in a sanctions program's overall success or failure. Instead, the difficulty in assessing the utility of sanctions stems from the persistent selection bias in the empirical literature: successes are overlooked, while failures are documented. The game theoretic literature points out the selection bias issue; scholars utilize game theory models to demonstrate why researchers will observe sanctions regimes that fail, and will miss sanctions threats that succeed. Even so, game theory's simulated world does not sufficiently explicate the mechanism behind the success or failure of a sanctions threat.

Sanctions commentators have recognized that power plays a role in determining a sanctions threat's effectiveness, but their mistake has been placing excessive emphasis on economic hegemony as the causal factor. Other researchers have attempted to improve the predictive ability of the economic power model by adding other factors, such as target

state self-interest. To date, however, none of these proposed explanations has satisfactorily solved the puzzle regarding the effectiveness of the sanctions tool. This Article argues that commentators pursuing a power explanation are on the right path, but rather than power derived from economic bases, the power behind a sanctions threat is derived from social influence.

[*152] In brief, social power theory offers a parsimonious solution to the sanctions dilemma because in general terms, a sanctions threat has a simple function: to exercise persuasive influence over a target state. Yet, social power theory is a complex theoretical concept, and though the five bases of social power--coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power--can appear deceptively facile, the theorem requires an in-depth understanding and knowledge to successfully employ. The policymaker utilizing social power theory must thoroughly comprehend each base of social power and its inner workings, as well as the interaction effects among the five bases. Notwithstanding, the effort social power theory requires of the practitioner is worthwhile; the Greco-Bulgarian case analysis demonstrates that social power theory has a cogent ability to construe why a sanctions threat succeeded. Hence, this Article avers that social power theory is a decisive instrument that the UN should employ whenever it plans to utilize a sanctions threat to achieve an underlying policy objective.

Social power theory is not a novel theoretical construct, but its application in the international sanctions context is unique. The theory provides substantial explanatory power in describing how a sanctions threat can be designed to meet its goals, though there may still be additional unexplored factors that play a role in the success or failure of a sanctions regime. As sanctions students further delve into social power theory, relaxing the assumptions operating in this analysis, employing various research methodologies across levels of analysis, and refining the criteria within each base of social power, the theory should become increasingly robust.

Recent cases of failed UN sanctions programs attest that there is an urgent need in the modern geopolitical context to explore theoretical concepts that can aid a sanctions program in succeeding at the threat stage. And as was previously noted, the point at which sanctions are threatened is claimed to be the greatest point of leverage for the UN. Hence, if social power theory can explain how to employ the threat of sanctions to better achieve a policy mandate, the international community has much to gain from this concept. Notwithstanding, adopting social power theory as an explanatory construct does not imply that all sanctions regimes can end at the threat stage. Though sanctions do serve an important signaling and symbolic function, at times the UN may be forced to impose sanctions against a target state, even if social power theory cautions against it. That said, by better understanding the five bases of social power and the interaction effects across each base of power, there is a substantial probability of improving the success of sanctions at the threat stage. In the words of Chesterman and Pouligny: "The psychological dimensions of sanctions are central to understanding how both the ruling elite and general populations [*153] experience the sanctions regime, and how sanctions might affect decision-making." n293

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

GovernmentsLocal GovernmentsChartersImmigration LawNonimmigrantsInternational Organization Employees (G Visas)International Trade LawGeneral Overview

FOOTNOTES:

n1 Simon Chesterman & Beatrice Pouligny, *The Politics of Sanctions (La Politique des Sanctions)*, INT'L PEACE ACADEMY (June 2002), at <http://www.ipacademy.org/AboutIPA/AboutIPA.htm> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). The English translation is "sanctions . . . stand between statements and soldiers." *Id.* For an excellent overview of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) after the Cold War, see David M. Malone, *The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study in the Creative Interpretation of the U.N. Charter*, 35 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 487 (2003).

n2 In full, Article 24(1) of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) provides: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n3 In full, Article 23(1-2) of the UN Charter provides:

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 23, paras. 1-2, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n4 In full, Article 25 of the UN Charter provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER, art. 25, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n5 In full, Article 39 of the UN Charter provides: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER, art. 39, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n6 In full, Article 40 of the UN Charter provides:

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties, concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply, with such provisional measures.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 40, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n7 In full, Article 41 of the UN Charter provides:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may, include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 41, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n8 In full, Article 42 of the UN Charter provides:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

U.N. CHARTER, art. 42, *available at* <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n9 HOSSEIN G. ASKARI ET AL., *ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: EXAMINING THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND EFFICACY* 43 (2003).

n10 Christopher C. Joyner, *United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See Ahead*, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329, 330 (2003). Although this article uses the terms "sanctions" and "economic sanctions" interchangeably throughout its analysis (as appears common in the sanctions literature), the student of sanctions should note that it is questionable whether some sanctions, such as targeted sanctions restricting diplomatic travel, are exclusively economic in nature.

n11 *Id.*

n12 *Id.* at 331.

n13 ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 43-44.

n14 *Id.* at 43.

n15 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 1. *See also* DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, *THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990s* 2 (2000).

n16 J. Stephanides, *A Brief Overview of United Nations Applied Sanctions: Informal background Paper Prepared by the United Nations Secretariat*, 1st Interlaken Seminar on Targeting U.N. Financial Sanctions 1 (March 17-19, 1998), at http://www.smartsanctions.ch/int1_papers.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). *See also* Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 2-5.

n17 Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury, *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: An Overview*, in *SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT* 1, 3 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000).

n18 S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 1276th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966).

n19 S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 2046th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977).

n20 Chan & Drury, *supra* note 17, at 3.

n21 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 3.

n22 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 4051st mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).

n23 S.C. Res. 864, U.N. SCOR, 3277th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/864 (1993).

n24 S.C. Res. 1298, U.N. SCOR, 4144th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (2000).

n25 S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).

n26 Iraq invaded and conquered Kuwait on August 1, 1990. In response to Kuwait's request, the UNSC convened on August 2, 1990 to evaluate the matter. The UNSC adopted Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990, which condemned the invasion, called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, and announced that the UNSC would monitor the situation to ensure compliance with its mandate. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990). The UNSC also adopted Resolution 661, which imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2932d mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990). In short, over a thirteen-year period the UNSC adopted at least sixty-five measures that related to the sanctions operation against Iraq. See Security Council Resolutions Concerning the Situation between Iraq and Kuwait, *at* <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/IraqKuwait/IraqResolutionsEng.htm> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n27 S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 3138th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/788 (1992).

n28 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063d mtg., at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).

n29 S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 3377th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994).

n30 S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997).

n31 S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 3039th mtg., at 55, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992).

n32 S.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 3660th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (1996).

n33 S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., at 42, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).

n34 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 2.

n35 *Id.* at 3.

n36 *Id.* As evidence for this claim, Cortright and Lopez state that by 1998 research commissions instituted within the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Brookings Institution had all undertaken studies focused on general or targeted sanctions policy. *Id.* at 3 n.8.

n37 *See* Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 1, 8; *see also* Stephanides, *supra* note 16.

n38 *See generally* ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9; DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX (1999).

n39 See generally CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15; DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, SANCTIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY: CHALLENGES TO UN ACTION (2002).

n40 Expert power is divided between expert power and informational power. See *infra* note 226.

n41 Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions*, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 236 (Kenneth Oye ed., 1986).

n42 See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (1985). For an excellent overview of the historical use of economic sanctions in world history, dating back to the Megarian Decree instituted by Athens in 432 B.C., see ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 4-28.

n43 Chan & Drury, *supra* note 17, at 1.

n44 *Id.*

n45 DREZNER, *supra* note 38, at 9-10.

n46 See *id.* at 10.

n47 See David Lektzian, *Making Sanctions Smarter: Are Humanitarian Costs an Essential Element in the Success of Sanctions?*, NORWEGIAN RED CROSS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, OSLO 6 (2003), at http://www.redcross.no/File.asp?File=Bilder/PDF/030826_sanksjons-rapport.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). For a detailed discussion on the definition of economic sanctions, see ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 76-84.

n48 William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, *A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions*, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 158, 160 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000).

n49 For an excellent overview of public choice theory as an alternative explanation for sanctions regimes, see Kaempfer & Lowenberg, *supra* note 48, at 158-59.

n50 See ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 81-82.

n51 A *jus cogens* norm is a rule of custom that is so significant that the international community will not allow states to contract out of them by treaty. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 23 (2001). Examples of *jus cogens* norms include genocide, slavery, and torture. *Id.* at 98.

n52 For a comprehensive review of the present understanding of economic sanctions, including the reasons behind their imposition, see Chan & Drury, *supra* note 17, at 18-20. See also ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 76-84.

n53 W. Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, *The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes*, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 87 (1998), available at <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol9/No1/art4.pdf> (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).

n54 *Id.* at 87.

n55 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 2. They divide economic sanctions into purposeful, palliative, punitive, and partisan. *Id.* First, purposeful sanctions are meant to encourage another nation to adopt a specified course of action. *Id.* Second, palliative sanctions are designed as a symbolic or signaling device. *Id.* Third, punitive sanctions are imposed simply to deliver punishment and nothing more, and nothing less. *Id.* Finally, partisan sanctions are instituted to provide an economic benefit or loss for a particular group in the sender country. *Id.* There is no dearth of alternative categorization schemes aside from the one cited here. Compare ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 94-96 (proposing an alternative classification system for economic sanctions). *Contra* Lektzian, *supra* note 47, at 7 [proposing sanction classifications based upon three goals: compellence, deterrence, and responding to domestic and international political interests (i.e., simply doing something, stigmatizing and embarrassing the target, or building support for the use of force)]. *Contra* Ronald Moore, *The Paradox of Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft*, Recipient of the Commandant's Award, National War College (2000), at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n00MooreParadoxofSanctions.rtf> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005), (proposing a simple dichotomy for all sanctions based upon whether the sanctions are coercive or expressive).

n56 An example of a belligerent group that bore the brunt of UNSC imposed sanctions was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). See also *supra* note 23.

n57 An excellent example of the United Nations (UN) addressing the economic factors that sustained a conflict is the case of conflict diamonds. In Angola and Sierra Leone, conflict diamonds funded the rebel groups, UNITA, and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), both of which were acting in contravention of the global community's objectives of restoring peace in these countries. *Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War*, United Nations Department of Public Information (2001), at <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). As a result, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on the role of diamonds in fueling conflict, breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a contribution to the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Id. See also G.A. Res. 56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (2000).

n58 One type of sanction designed to express outrage is the "shame sanction." This sanction is designed only to shame and embarrass the target state for its egregious behavior in the eyes of the international community. For further reading on this topic, see James Q. Whitman, *What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?*, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998).

n59 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 2.

n60 *See id.* at 2.

n61 *See* LISA L MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992).

n62 *Id.*

n63 Daryl J. Levinson, *Collective Sanctions*, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 394 (2003).

n64 *Id.*

n65 *See* Chan & Drury, *supra* note 17, at 9.

n66 Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 394.

n67 *Id.* at 394-95.

n68 *See* CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 19.

n69 Johan Galtung, *On the Effects of International Sanctions*, in *DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS AND WORLD POLITICS* 22-27 (Miroslav Nincic & Peter Wallensteen eds., 1983). See Lektzian, *supra* note 47, at 7-14, for a detailed discussion of the naive theory of sanctions. *See also* Baldwin, *supra* note 42, at 136-38.

n70 *See* Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 394-95.

n71 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 20.

n72 Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 406.

n73 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 20. Concerning the risk of increased support for the sanctioned target state's policy makers, Andrew Mack and Asif Khan state: "In reality, sanctions often increase popular support for the regimes against which they are targeted, especially when the state controls the media and can guarantee that its 'spin' on who is responsible for the sanctions-induced hardship gets the widest hearing." Andrew Mack & Asif Khan, *The Efficacy of UN Sanctions*, 31 *SECURITY DIALOGUE* 279, 282 (2000).

n74 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 20.

n75 Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 406.

n76 ELIZABETH GIBBONS, *SANCTIONS IN HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY UNDER ASSAULT* 38-39 (1999).

n77 Strategic Planning Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary General, United Nations [hereinafter UN Strategic Planning Unit], *UN Sanctions: How Effective? How Necessary?*, Paper prepared for the 2nd Interlaken Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions 104 (Mar. 29-31, 1999), at <http://www.smartsanctions.ch/Papers/I2/2unintro.pdf> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n78 *See generally* Craig Forcece, *Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration*, 5 *YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.* 1 (2002); *see also* Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, *Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?*, 32 *LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS.* 11 (2000); Cassandra LaRae-Perez, Note, *Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force: Reevaluating the Legality of Sanctions from an Effects-Based Perspective*, 20 *B.U. INT'L L.J.* 161 (2002).

n79 See Roger Normand & Christoph Wilcke, *Human Rights, Sanctions, and Terrorist Threats: The United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq*, 11 TRANSNATIONAL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299 (2001); see also Reem Bahdi, *Iraq, Sanctions, and Security: A Critique*, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 237 (2002); Peggy Kozal, *Is the Continued Use of Sanctions as Implemented Against Iraq a Violation of International Human Rights*, 282 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 383 (2000).

n80 David Cortright & George A. Lopez, *Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s*, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002).

n81 *Id.* at 10-15.

n82 Compare *id.* at 15 (arguing that whether sanctions are comprehensive or targeted, their impact depends more upon the underlying political factors motivating the sanctions rather than the sanctions tool itself), with CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 208 (arguing that "comprehensive, rigorously enforced sanctions" are likely to be successful), and Lektzian, *supra* note 47, at 24 (arguing that there is "little justification for [imposing] comprehensive sanctions").

n83 See KOENRAD VAN BRABANT, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, CAN SANCTIONS BE SMARTER? THE CURRENT DEBATE, (1999), at <http://www.odihpn.org/pdfbin/sanconf.pdf> (last visited Mar. 12, 2005); see also STOCKHOLM PROCESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TARGETED SANCTIONS, MAKING TARGETED SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE: GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN POLICY OPTIONS, (Peter Wallensteen et al. eds., 2003), at <http://www.smartsanctions.se/reports/Final%20report%20complete.pdf> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n84 See Valerie L. Schwebach, *Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?*, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 187, 189 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000); see also Galtung, *supra* note 69; Fredrick Hoffman, *The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis*, 4 J. PEACE RES. 140, 154-55 (1967); Peter Wallensteen, *Characteristics of Economic Sanctions*, 5 J. PEACE RES. 247, 265 (1968); Margaret P. Doxey, *International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the U.N. and Southern Africa*, 26 INT'L ORG. 527 (1972); Anna P. Schreiber, *Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic*, 25 WORLD POL. 387 (1973); Klaus Knorr, *International Economic Leverage and Its Uses*, in ECONOMIC ISSUES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 99 (Klaus Knorr & Frank N. Trager eds., 1977), Richard C. Porter, *International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy*, 23 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (1979); Henry Bienen & Robert Gilpin, *Economic Sanctions as a Response to Terrorism*, 3 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 89 (1980); MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 8 (1987); Richard N. Haass, *Sanctioning Madness*, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 74 (1997).

n85 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 13.

n86 MARGARET P. DOXEY, *INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE* 65 (2d ed. 1996).

n87 See UN Strategic Planning Unit, *supra* note 77, 103-06. Note as well, the social impact of sanctions (humanitarian and ethical concerns) can erode political support for a sanctions regime, thereby impacting the international cooperation that is vital for the effective implementation and enforcement of sanctions. CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 24. These social impacts are often beyond the control of the sender state, as the leaders in the sanctioned states "control much of the negative humanitarian impact through their allocation of scarce resources . . ." *Id.* at 25.

n88 Kaempfer & Lowenberg, *supra* note 48, at 159.

n89 One point that deserves mention is there is some consensus among scholars on the objective economic factors that will impact the effectiveness of the sanctions tool as an instrument of coercion. These factors include when the economic penalties on the target country is substantial, exceeding 2% of the gross domestic product; when the target country is heavily dependent on the sanctioning states for trade; and when the sanctioning states are much larger economically than the targeted regime. CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 18. See also MAKIO MIYAGAWA, *DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK?* 24-28 (1992). Each of these idea's is indicative of a simple point: threatening or inflicting high economic costs on a target state can be an effective means to coerce a target to take action. ELIZABETH DESOMBRE, *DOMESTIC SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER* 165 (2000). Yet, utilizing this objective criterion relies on a functionalist rationale that is not dispositive of a sanctions regime's success based upon extant research (e.g., consider the high costs the recent sanctions regime inflicted upon Iraq). At most, researchers know that economic costs play a role in sanctions success, but the extent of that role, and how that role varies across each unique sanctions scenario, requires further research. Other suggested factors, such as the claim that the sanctioning state must incur high sender costs for sanctions to succeed, remain in dispute. See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 18. Lastly, Cortright and Lopez argue that swift, forceful sanctions are more effective than slow, incremental measures, but this claim contradicts the position taken by the UN. *Id.* at 26-27, 215.

n90 GARY C. HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, AND KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, *ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY* (2d ed. 1990).

n91 *Id.*

n92 The IIE Study database was updated in 1999 with 50 new sanctions cases from the 1990s (IEE Study II). IIE Study II assessed 170 sanctions episodes from 1914 to 1999 and found an overall success rate of 35%; this success rate is comparable to that found in IEE Study I. CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 15 n.9 (citing Kimberly Ann Elliott & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, *Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s*, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 403 (1999)); Elliott, comments on manuscript in letter to authors, Sept. 20, 1999.

n93 Peter van Bergeijk criticized the IIE Study for having too high a benchmark for success, noting that sanctions may have multiple objectives. Peter van Bergeijk, *Economic Sanctions, Autocracy, Democracy, and Success* (unpublished paper, presented at the Conference on the Effectiveness and Effects of UN Sanctions, Tilburg 1997) (on file with author) (reporting on research conducted at the Economic Policy Directorate's Research Unit of the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs).

n94 Robert Pape, *Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work*, 22 INT'L SEC. 90 (1997). See also J. Dashti-Gibson, P. Davis, & B. Radcliff, *On the Determinants of Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis*, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 608 (1997) (paper points out methodological problems in the IIE Study, and the researchers employ a different research methodology and statistical analysis to discern the key elements affecting the success of sanctions).

n95 Pape, *supra* note 94, at 90.

n96 See Daniel W. Drezner, *The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes*, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 212, 218-21 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000). Drezner argues that in Pape's quest for monocausality, he commits three serious methodological errors. First, Pape downplays discomfoting facts surrounding several of the cases in the database in order to recode the cases as failures. *Id.* at 218. Second, Pape presumes that if a sanctioned target's policymaking regime was removed through extra-constitutional means such as a coup, then it was this pressure--as opposed to the sanctions--that affected the outcome. *Id.* at 219. Third, and finally, in Pape's attempt to show that sanctions never work, he makes the imposition of sanctions the independent variable, failing to consider the issue of whether economic pressure can enhance the effectiveness of force. *Id.*

n97 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 15-17.

n98 *Id.*

n99 See Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 1.

n100 A larger database of cases (*N-size*) allows the study of a more heterogeneous population, it increases the probability of obtaining a smaller statistical error, and it is generally better suited for complex multivariate statistical analysis. See generally PETER R. STOPHER, SURVEY SAMPLING AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS (1979).

n101 See generally HUFBAUER ET AL., *supra* note 90.

n102 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 204.

n103 *Id.* at 15-17. One alternative explanation proposed for recent difficulties in measuring sanctions success is that sanctions also serve as international tools of enforcement to deter, punish, or stigmatize a target. UN Strategic Planning Unit, *supra* note 77, at 101, 108-09. This point is true, but it does not add anything to the discourse on sanctions effectiveness. In the case where a sanctions program is instituted for deterrence, punishment, or stigmatization of a target, these objectives are meant to serve an underlying policy objective of the sanctions regime. Therefore, it is unclear why a sanctions program with this design type could not be analyzed effectively through qualitative or quantitative research methodology. For example, assume a UN imposed sanctions program is instituted to punish and stigmatize a target state for knowingly harboring terrorists that were recently arrested and convicted in an international terrorism scheme. Here, the target state is being punished and stigmatized ex-post for its actions in harboring these criminals. The policy goal of the sanctions program would likely be to encourage the target to forgo future harboring of terrorists by modifying its national policies. In contrast, if this punishment were inflicted without any policy objective whatsoever (i.e., just to inflict pain), then it would not fit the definition of a sanction for purposes of this analysis.

n104 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 19.

n105 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 629 (1990).

n106 Justin D. Stalls, *Economic Sanctions*, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L COMP. L. REV. 115, 147 (2003).

n107 *Id.*

n108 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 18. One example of differing state goals is presented in the context of the sanctions imposed against Iraq under Security Council Resolution 661 (1990). Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 5. In May of 1991 after the ground war in Iraq had concluded and a cease fire has been passed, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister John Major stated that the UK would veto any measure to weaken the sanctions in Iraq as long as Sadaam Hussein remained in power. *Id.* The following month in a letter to the President of the UNSC, the UK further stated that it would exercise its veto powers to block any resolution to lift Iraqi sanctions until two British nationals were released from captivity. *Id.*

n109 *See* HUFBAUER ET AL., *supra* note 90.

n110 *See* CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 37-220.

n111 *See* Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 5 (discussing the UK's veto threat in lifting Iraqi sanctions in 1991 unless Sadaam Hussein was removed from power and Iraq released two British nationals from captivity); *see also* CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 18-19.

n112 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 18; *see also* Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 7; *see also generally* Schwebach, *supra* note 84, at 192-202.

n113 HUFBAUER ET AL., *supra* note 90 (the five cases that ended at the threat stage are: League of Nations v. Yugoslavia (1921); League of Nations v. Greece (1925); USSR v. Romania (1963); United States v. South Korea (1975); and United States v. El Salvador (1987)).

n114 *Id.*

n115 Reisman & Stevick, *supra* note 53, at 90.

n116 *Id.*

n117 *See id.* Notably, Reisman and Stevick argue that at the communications stage, the threat of a credible military sanctions program is likely to be a more successful application of a threat than a credible economic sanctions program. *Id.* Although this assertion appears reasonable, the authors present no empirical evidence to support this claim. *Id.* The argument appears to hinge upon allegations that military sanctions are quick to implement and irreversible, while economic sanctions are slow to implement and cumulative in impact. *Id.* Despite this contention, it is possible for the economic impact of a strict and punishing economic sanctions program to hurt a deviant target state much faster than military intervention; military operations take time to approve, plan, and implement. Moreover, there is no reasonable justification for asserting that a military operation cannot cease.

n118 *See id.*

n119 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 7.

n120 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 39, at 13. In their latest 2002 publication, Cortright and Lopez note that they were surprised with an unexpected finding while analyzing sanctions cases: they discovered that "the threat of sanctions is often more powerful than the sanctions themselves." *Id.* The researchers found seven cases where the threat of sanctions caused the target regime to respond with bargaining gestures or offers of partial compliance. *See id.* at 14. Two particularly interesting situations for further exploration of the sanctions threat and its leverage are the cases of Sudan and Libya. *See id.* at 116-20.

n121 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 162.

n122 Daniel W. Drezner, *The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion*, 57 INT'L ORG. 643, 644 (2003).

n123 Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, A Theory of Economic Sanctions 3 (Aug. 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), at <http://www.leidenuniv.nl/fsw/ecpr/pubchoice/niou.pdf> (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).

n124 Of course, one might retort that we do not exist in a world of perfect information. This point is patently true, but the game theoretic literature's prediction can easily be applied to the rational utility maximizer. If a sender threatens sanctions and the target stands firm, the sender will face a choice between backing down or imposing sanctions upon the target. Sanctions disrupt the status quo, and will impose a cost upon both the sender and the target, *ceteris paribus*. As a result, successful instances of economic coercion are more likely to end at the threat stage as opposed to the imposition stage. Why? Because an agreement reached between the sender and the target before sanctions imposition avoids the deadweight cost of the sanctions, thereby resulting in a more "efficient" outcome. See Drezner, *supra* note 119, at 645. Professor Drezner proposes an advanced game theoretic framework entitled the conflict expectations model, which predicts that the potential to extract concessions depends to a great extent on the future for potential conflict between two adversaries (the greater the chance of future conflict, the lower the probability of the sender extracting concessions from the target). See Drezner, *supra* note 38; see also Daniel W. Drezner, *Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion*, 42 INT'L STUD. QTLY. 709 (1998).

n125 Lacy & Niou, *supra* note 123, at 19. Alistair Smith also concurs by arguing that the threat of sanctions may never be seen at all. See Alistair Smith, *The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions*, 21 INT'L INTERACTIONS 229, 240 (1996). Furthermore, Professors Lacy and Niou appropriately point out that few scholars have taken the time to review the nested selection problems that exist in the empirical literature on economic sanctions. Lacy & Niou, *supra* note 123, at 19. The cases where sanctions were imposed are not randomly drawn from cases where sanctions were threatened, and the cases in which sanctions were threatened are not randomly drawn from cases in which sanctions were a potential policy tool of international enforcement during a conflict. *Id.*

n126 HUFBAUER ET AL., *supra* note 90 (listing the four successful cases that ended at the threat stage: League of Nations v. Yugoslavia (1921), League of Nations v. Greece (1925), United States v. South Korea (1975), and United States v. El Salvador (1987), while the unsuccessful case that ended at the threat stage was the USSR v. Romania (1963). For further details on the League of Nations cases, see ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 34-41.

n127 Drezner, *supra* note 122, at 652.

n128 *Id.* at 654.

n129 *Id.* Over the 195 observations in Drezner's study, the correlation between the imposition of sanctions and the low success rate is significant at .001%. *Id.*

n130 *Id.* at 653-54. Although the 52% success rate is rather impressive for a sanctions regime that was actually imposed, Professor DeSombre notes that in many of the cases where sanctions were instituted, the target capitulated and modified their behavior within a few days of the sanctions imposition; the target realized that the sanctions threat was not a bluff. DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 171-244. These findings agree with the notion that the threat of sanctions signals a strong sense of resolve by the sending state, as sanctions impose costs on both parties; the state levying the sanctions deliberately sacrifices the benefits of the relationship with the target state. Schwebach, *supra* note 84, at 191-92. However, states that consistently bluff others regarding the implementation of sanctions can erode the effectiveness of the threat of sanctions as a policy tool. *Id.* In the context of the DeSombre study, it is possible that the target states did not believe that the sender was sincere in its resolve to sanction, but once a sanction regime was instituted, the target quickly discerned that the state was not bluffing. *Id.* As a result, the target state quickly succumbed to the sender's demands. See Drezner, *supra* note 38, at 15-17, for more on the signaling approach to sanctions; see also Drezner, *supra* note 96, at 213-17.

n131 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 159.

n132 *Id.* (citing Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, *Extra-Treaty Sanctions*, paper presented at the Harvard/MIT Seminar on International Institutions and Political Economy (Dec. 10, 1992)).

n133 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 160.

n134 Reisman & Stevik, *supra* note 53, at 87.

n135 See *id.* (discussing Costa Rica's use of "banana diplomacy" against the Organization of American States following the stormy election of the Secretary-General).

n136 MARGARET P. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 110-11 (1987). See also DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 168-70 (describing two economic elements that are critical to obtaining market power).

n137 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 166-70. See also Schwebach, *supra* note 84, at 189-92, for further reading on economic sanctions and their role as a signal of resolve.

n138 See generally BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PEOPLE'S POWER, PREFERENCES, AND PERCEPTIONS (2000).

n139 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 160.

n140 See ASKARI ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 81-82 (explaining that the economic sanctions literature has often erred in confusing the "means" (the sanctions tool) with the "ends" (the policy objective)).

n141 Cortright & Lopez, *supra* note 80, at 15.

n142 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 149. Professor DeSombre argues that self-interest should be seen as a continuum: because states only adopt policies that they choose to, policy adoption may be a result of pure self-interest on one end of a continuum, and self-interest created by outside pressure on the other end. *Id.* at 159. An example of self-interest created by outside pressure would be a situation where a state is forced to comply with a policy via coercive means, and when the coercion ceases, the state continues the policy because it would be too costly to change (e.g., a new production process that resulted from coercion is cost prohibitive to change). *Id.*

n143 Cortright & Lopez, *supra* note 80, at 16 ("Sanctions are best understood as instruments of persuasion rather than punishment.").

n144 See DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 161.

n145 See Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 75.

n146 John R. P. French & Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power*, in *STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER* 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959). See Bertram H. Raven, *The Bases of Power: Origins and Recent Developments*, 49 *J. OF Soc. ISSUES* 227 (1993), for a history and background of social power, as well as a more comprehensive interpretation of the original French and Raven framework. See also DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, *POWER: THE INNER EXPERIENCE* (1975), for a more thorough review of the power motive and its operation. See generally MAX WEBER, *THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION* (A.M. Parsons & T. Parsons eds. 1947), for an earlier perspective on social influence that contrasts power and authority.

n147 See Timothy R. Hinkin & Chester A. Schriesheim, *Development and Application of New Scales to Measure the French and Raven (1959) Bases of Social Power*, 74 *J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.* 561 (1989).

n148 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 155-56.

n149 Hinkin & Schriesheim, *supra* note 147, at 561, (citing HENRY MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (1983)). The fact that the French and Raven power framework has garnered broad acceptance and utilization does not imply that there have not been criticisms. For instance, a commonly levied critique is that the five power bases lack conceptual consistency regarding the origin or source of the influence. *See generally* Martin Patchen, *The Locus and Basis of Influence on Organizational Decisions*, 11 ORG. BEH. & HUM: PERF. 195 (1974); GARY A. YUKL, LEADERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS (1981). Moreover, the empirical research studying French and Raven's model has also been criticized because it has generally been limited to field studies using single-item rating scales (as opposed to Likert-type measures). *See generally* Philip M. Podsakoff & Chester A. Schriesheim, *Field Studies of French & Raven's Bases of Power: Critique; Reanalysis, and Suggestions for Future Research*, 97 PSYCH. BULL. 387 (1985); Chester A. Schriesheim et al., *Have Measurement Shortcomings Produced Erroneous Results in Field Investigations of the Five French and Raven Power Bases? An Empirical Examination*, PROC. S. MGMT. ASS'N 101 (1985). Nevertheless, these alleged shortcomings were addressed in a recent study by Professor Hinkin and Professor Schriesheim, which produced encouraging results. *See* Hinkin & Schriesheim, *supra* note 147.

n150 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 150.

n151 *Id.* at 151.

n152 In a discussion with Aubrey Immelman, Professor of Psychology at St. John's University, he suggested that the closest non-technical equivalent for the term "life force" would be the social environment. E-mail correspondence with Aubrey Immelman, Associate Professor of Psychology, Saint John's Univ. (Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with author). For further reading on the "life force" concept, see KARL LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951) and RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, 1 UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR: THE DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL FIELD (1975).

n153 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 151. Although French and Raven focus on psychological change in an individual, it is assumed for purposes of this analysis that a "party" is any target of a sanctions regime: an individual, a few individuals, a group, a government, or an entire state. Because the international sanctions literature tends to personify states as unitary actors, the characterization of a party in this manner should not cause great concern. *See* Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 403 n.282.

n154 *Id.*

n155 *Id.*

n156 The reader may recognize that this hypothetical scenario represents the naive theory of sanctions. *See* Galtung, *supra* note 69, at 22-27; *see also* Lektzian, *supra* note 47, at 7-14.

n157 The social agent O can be a person, group, role, or norm. French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 151. For purposes of this analysis, O is the party instituting the sanctions. In the remainder of the paper, the initial "P" is employed to refer to the social influence target, while the

initial "O" is employed to refer to the social influence agent.

n158 See Jeffrey N. Weatherly et al., *Social Influence as Stimulus Control*, 9 BEH. & SOC. ISS. 25, 26 (1999), at http://www.behavior.org/journals_BSI/1999/Weatherly.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2005); see also PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, *THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE* (1991).

n159 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 151.

n160 Obviously, any act that O engenders in system a can produce other effects within the same life space (i.e., social environment) because of interdependencies across systems. French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 151-52. However, the French and Raven model focuses on direct effects in a targeted system that are produced by social influence and is less concerned with secondary indirect effects in other systems, or changes that result from nonsocial influences. *Id.* This focus on direct effects in no way implies that secondary effects are irrelevant. In fact, there are cases where the secondary effects could be quite devastating to the intended outcome of the social influence on some system. *Id.*

n161 *Id.* at 152.

n162 Positive influence would occur where the force produced by O exceeds the resisting force created by O's act, and negative influence would occur where the force produced by O is exceeded by the resisting force created by O's act. *See id.*

n163 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 152.

n164 *See id.*

n165 *Id.* at 153. In the formula, "f" refers to force; "-f" refers to resistance; "a" refers to the system in the life space of P; "x" refers to the direction the force attempts to exert on the system; and "max" signifies the maximum resultant of force and resistance.

n166 *Id.*

n167 *Id.* at 154.

n168 *Id.* This formula has an inherent weakness in that it assumes that $s2(a)$ is static. Instead, O's influence may gradually weaken over time, thereby creating a new system point at $s3(a)$, and so forth. *See id.* The degree of dependence at the later time period $s4(a)$ would still be equal to the amount of retrogression toward the initial equilibrium state, $s1(a)$. *Id.* However, the researcher must be cognizant of the system move from $s2(a)$ to $s3(a)$ or else she risks misinterpreting the system's degree of dependence following the initial application of social influence. Unfortunately, this temporal problem does not have a simple solution because of the manner in which the degree of dependence variable is operationalized.

n169 *Id.* at 155. French and Raven state that it is rare for a researcher to say with certainty that a given empirical case of power is limited to one source. *Id.*

n170 *Id.* Expert power is divided between expert power and informational power. *See* Raven, *infra* note 226, at 236.

n171 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 157.

n172 *Id.*

n173 *Id.*

n174 Cortright & Lopez, *supra* note 80, at 9; CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 209. As support for the claim that compliance is the key to sanctions effectiveness, Cortright and Lopez compare the UN sanctions cases of Libya (success) and Haiti (failure). *Id.* In the case of Libya, the near universal compliance with the aviation ban effectively isolated the Qaddafi regime, both politically and diplomatically. *Id.* In the case of Haiti, the comprehensive trade sanctions imposed were inconsistently applied, lifted, and then reapplied. *Id.* *But see generally* Drezner, *supra* note 96, at 217 (comparing three theoretical approaches to coercive sanctions outcomes--the domestic politics approach, signaling approach, and conflict expectations approach--and discussing their ability to generate concessions).

n175 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 158. French and Raven explain that at times there can be some difficulty distinguishing between coercive power and reward power. For example, one might argue that withholding a reward is equivalent to a punishment. The answer to what is a punishment and what is a reward is psychological, and depends upon the situation as it exists for the party in question. They argue that the best means of distinguishing the two is to determine whether the applied force produces a positive or negative valence. *Id.*

n176 *Id.* at 156-57.

n177 *Id.* at 158.

n178 Bertram H. Raven, *Social Power and Compliance in Health Care*, in TOPICS IN HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 229, 233 (S. Maes et al. eds., 1988) (citing JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959)).

n179 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 7.

n180 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 158.

n181 *See id.* at 161.

n182 *Id.* at 156.

n183 According to Professor Donelson R. Forsyth, the ability to mediate rewards becomes a power base only if the target: (1) values the rewards; (2) is dependent on the powerholder for the resource; and (3) perceives the party that mediates the rewards is credible. DONELSON R. FORSYTH, GROUP DYNAMICS 182 (2d ed. 1990).

n184 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 156, 158.

n185 *Id.* at 156-57.

n186 Raven, *supra* note 178, at 232-33.

n187 William J. Long, *Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation*, 44 INT'L STUD. Q. 77 (1996).

n188 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 156-57.

n189 *Id.* at 157.

n190 *Id.* at 161.

n191 *Id.* at 158. This claim is based on the fact that legitimate power draws on concepts from structural sociology, social psychology, and clinical psychology. *Id.*

n192 *Id.* at 159.

n193 *See generally* WEBER, *supra* note 146.

n194 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 159.

n195 *See id.* at 160.

n196 Simon Chesterman, *East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building*, International Peace Academy 15 (2001), at <http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublEastTimorPrint.htm> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n197 *Id.* at 16. *See also* S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999), at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/264/81/PDF/N9926481.pdf?OpenElement> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n198 Chesterman, *supra* note 196, at 16. *See also* S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc., S/RES/1272 (1999), at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/312/77/PDF/N9931277.pdf?OpenElement> (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n199 DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 146. *See also* THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).

n200 *See* DESOMBRE, *supra* note 89, at 147-48.

n201 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 160.

n202 *Id.* at 161.

n203 *See* Article 24 of the UN Charter, *supra* note 2.

n204 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 161.

n205 *Id.*

n206 *See* CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 21; *see also* Lori Fisler Damrosch, *The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions*, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 302 (1993).

n207 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 161.

n208 FORSYTH, *supra* note 183, at 184.

n209 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 161-62.

n210 *Id.* at 162.

n211 In full, Article 4 of the UN Charter provides:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

U.N. CHARTER art. 4.

n212 *See* French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 162-63.

n213 *Id.* at 162.

n214 *Id.*

n215 *Id.* at 163.

n216 *See id.*

n217 *Id.*

n218 *See id.* at 158.

n219 *See id.* at 158, 162.

n220 *See id.* at 163.

n221 RICHARD H. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, & OUTCOMES 129 (4th ed. 1987). Typical examples of expert power would be the doctor/patient relationship and the attorney/client relationship.

n222 FORSYTH, *supra* note 183, at 18.

n223 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 163.

n224 See Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, *The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness*, 15 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 635 (1952).

n225 French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 164.

n226 French and Raven did not include information power as a separate component in their seminal paper. See French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 155-56. Instead, Raven introduced this separate base of social power in a later article. See Bertram H. Raven, *Social Power and Compliance in Health Care*, in TOPICS IN HEALTH PSYCHOL. 229, 236 (S. Maes et al. eds., 1988).

n227 Note however, many commentators continue to include information power in the definition of expert power. See Hinkin & Schriesheim, *supra* note 147, at 562 (defining expert power as "the ability to administer to another information, knowledge, or expertise"). But see FORSYTH, *supra* note 183 (does not distinguish information power).

n228 FORSYTH, *supra* note 183, at 234-36.

n229 *Id.*; see also French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 164.

n230 FORSYTH, *supra* note 183, at 234-36.

n231 GEORGE SCOTT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 126 (1973). For additional reading on the League of Nations, see JAMES BARROS, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE GREAT POWERS (1970).

n232 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 126.

n233 *Id.*

n234 FRANCES P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 310 (1965).

n235 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 127.

n236 LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECRETARIAT, TEN YEARS OF WORLD CO-OPERATION 31 (1930) [hereinafter LONS].

n237 In full, Article 10 reads:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.

n238 In full, Article 11 reads:

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared, to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11.

n239 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 127.

n240 *Id.* For the actual text of the telegram, see LONS, *supra* note 232, at 31.

n241 *Id.* at 32.

n242 WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 312.

n243 *Id.*

n244 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 128.

n245 LONS, *supra* note 236, at 32.

n246 WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 312.

n247 *Id.*

n248 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 128. For the Council's request in textual format, see LONS, *supra* note 236, at 32-33.

n249 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 128.

n250 WALTERS, *supra* note 236, at 312.

n251 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 129.

n252 In full, Article 16 reads:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake

immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16.

n253 WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 313.

n254 *Id.*

n255 *Id.*

n256 *Id.*

n257 *Id.*

n258 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 130; WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 313.

n259 WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 313.

n260 SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 130. WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 314.

n261 *Id.*

n262 HUFBAUER ET AL., *supra* note 90, at 128.

n263 Because Bulgaria was not the aggressor in this incident--Greek forces entered Bulgarian territory as a result of the frontier affray--the paper does not apply the five bases of social power to it, even though Bulgaria was also forced to comply with the LON resolution. *See* Scott, *supra* note 231, at 126; Walters, *supra* note 234, at 311.

n264 BARROS, *supra* note 231, at 96, 119.

n265 Similarly, it seems unrealistic to assume Greece could hide its noncompliance; Greece's actions would be highly observable in the case of a state invasion.

n266 *See* SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 51, 407-18.

n267 WALTERS, *supra* note 234, at 313.

n268 This averment is questionable because Greece had recently come under the rule of a dictator. *See* MODERN GREECE: A SHORT HISTORY 212-37 (5th ed. 2000). As such, the target in this case could have illustrated dependent system change, which would require the ongoing legitimate power of the influencing social agent.

n269 *See* FORSYTH, *supra* note 183, at 184.

n270 *See* French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 155-65.

n271 In full, Article 12 reads:

The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12.

n272 There is a possibility that the report of the Commission contained no informational power whatsoever. As was discussed in the section on legitimate power, a promise can create legitimate power. Hence, Greece could have conferred an increased level of legitimate power upon the Council by agreeing to abide by the findings of the Commission before the investigation had actually taken place.

n273 Although the LON did not exercise reward power in the Greco-Bulgarian dispute, the Council had the power to both reward and punish in adjudicating disputes between LON member states, as would any adjudicatory body. See LON Covenant Article 12, *supra* note 271.

n274 At the beginning of the skirmish between the two states, Greece demanded that Bulgaria apologize, punish the officers responsible for killing the Greek officer, and pay Greece substantial compensation. SCOTT, *supra* note 231, at 126.

n275 For a view that the entire episode was one of hegemony, see *id.* at 130.

n276 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 28; see also CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 39, at 5-6. As evidence for the effectiveness of jointly employing punishment and rewards, Cortright and Lopez compare the cases of Yugoslavia and Iraq. See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 209; see also *supra* text accompanying note 174.

n277 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 29.

n278 See generally FRENCH & RAVEN, *supra* note 146.

n279 Gitty M. Amini, *A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence?* Working Paper no. 12, UCLA Center for International Relations (May 1997). See generally THE PRICE OF PEACE: INCENTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT PREVENTION (David Cortright ed., 1997) (comprehensive study on positive inducements). Of course, the Amini study would need to be further scrutinized in order to determine whether there were other bases of social power that impacted the study's results.

n280 A typical "sunset clause" allows the UNSC to lift sanctions against a target state if certain measures are taken or conditions are met. Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 5. This formulation of a sunset clause was included in resolutions dealing with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1993), Haiti (1993), Libya (1993), and Angola (1998). *Id.*

n281 See Michael Mastanduno, *The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice*, in ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AN ENDURING DEBATE 175 (Edward D. Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins eds., 2003). Mastanduno argues that the research community's fixation with economic coercion probably results from the fact that coercion has been studied much more extensively than rewards in the sanctions context, even though rewards can be just as effective, if not more so, than coercion. Hence, the increasingly frequent call for incentives appears to be justified. For instance, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a 2001 report to the UNSC called for proposals that included incentives in an effort to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. *The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General*, U.N. GAOR, 55th sess., Agenda Item 46, at para. 61, U.N. Doc. A/55/907-S/2001/384, at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/335/89/PDF/N0133589.pdf?OpenElement> (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).

n282 Jason Davidson & George Shambaugh, *Who's Afraid of Economic Incentives? The Efficacy-Externality Tradeoff*, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 37, 64 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000). See also Van Brabant, *supra* note 83, at 11.

n283 George A. Lopez et al., *Learning from the Sanctions Decade*, Fourth Freedom Forum para. 19, at http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page_id=41 (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).

n284 See French & Raven, *supra* note 146, at 164. Recall that expert power requires the target believe that the social agent is credible and truthful. *Id.*

n285 Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 403 n.282

n286 There are three levels of analysis commonly used in international relations theory: system, state, and individual. Curtis H. Martin, *The US-North Korean Agreed Framework: Incentives-based Diplomacy after the Cold War*, in SANCTIONS AS ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 86, 87 (Steve Chan & A. Cooper Drury eds., 2000), (citing KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR (1959)). A fourth level of analysis--the group level--is a suggested addition. For instance, Levinson points out that group solidarity is a key factor in the effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions regimes. See Levinson, *supra* note 63, at 403-06.

n287 See Drezner, *supra* note 122, at 652 (the data used is applicable here).

n288 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 16.

n289 Conversation with Professor Emilio Cardenas, visiting Professor at University of Michigan Law School, Argentinian Ambassador to the United Nations, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Mar. 23, 2004).

n290 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 15, at 89-103.

n291 Daniel W. Drezner, *Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?*, 54 INT'L ORG. 73, 98 (2000).

n292 CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, *supra* note 39, at 201.

n293 Chesterman & Pouligny, *supra* note 1, at 6.